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

AN EXPANDED ROLE

FOR UNITED STATES RESERVE FORCES

IN CENTRAL AMERICA

AND THE CARIBBEAN

APRIL 1988

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

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Central America and the Caribbean Basin, long in the backwater of United States foreign policy priorities, has now moved to center stage. Revolutionary changes are sweeping the area, changes with profound consequences. This paper attempts to identify the strategic interests of the United States in the region, examine the phenomena and causes of regional instability, review past United States policies in the area, outline the parameters of a developing United States doctrine for Low Intensity Conflict, and propose an expanded, strategic military humanitarian/civic assistance mission for United States National Guard and Reserve forces, a mission of calculated compassion to alleviate the root causes of Latin American insurgency--poverty, social injustice, ignorance and disease. Keywords:

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A TIME TO BUILD:

AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR UNITED STATES RESERVE FORCES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

By

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WASHINGTON, D.C. APRIL 1988

To

William J. Lederer

and

Eugene Burdick

...if only we had listened.

DISCLAIMER

The opinions presented in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Inter-American Defense College, the Inter-American Defense Board, the Organization of American States, the government of the United States of America, the United States Department of Defense, the National Guard of the United States nor any branch, command, installation, agency or element thereof.

Due to research constraints, the author was unable to secure the complete documents of all sources cited. Therefore, secondary source citations occassionally have been used for which the context has not been verified. Such secondary citations are clearly identified in the text.

ABSTRACT

Introduction. Central America and the Caribbean Basin, long in the backwater of United States foreign policy priorities, has now moved to center stage. A series of extraordinary recent events have catapulted it into the international limelight. The Panama Canal treaties, the Nicaraguan revolution, the Salvadoran civil war, the Guatemalan insurgency, renewed Cuban activitism in revolutionary activities, the dramatic increase of Central American refugees into the United States and other countries, and the United States intervention in Granada have served to highlight the situation in Central America and the Caribbean Basin. Revolutionary socio-economic political and military changes are sweeping the area, changes with profound consequences.

The challenge for the United States is to understand the changes taking place in the region, analyze their root causes and probable consequences and formulate a reasonable policy that will balance its own long term strategic interests with the individual and collective interests of the peoples of the region. To that end, this paper attempts to identify the strategic national interests of the United States in the region, examine the phenomena and causes of regional instability, review past United States policies in the area, outline the parameters of a developing United States doctrine for Low Intensity Conflict, and propose an expanded, strategic military humanitarian/civic assistance mission for United States National Guard and Reserve forces, a mission of calculated compassion to alleviate the root causes of Latin American insurgency--poverty, social injustice, ignorance and disease.

U.S. Strategic Interests. There is no doubt that vital United States interests are at stake in Central America and the Caribbean Basin. Raw materials, notably bauxite from Jamaica and oil from Mexico and Venezuela, are strategically significant to the United States. Various military bases, to include those in Panama as well as the various Naval Sound Surveillance System sites scattered around the area, are militarily important. The area has vital sea lanes of communication and the Panama Canal, passages of strategic economic and considerable military importance. Even a critical examination reveals Central America and the Caribbean Basin to have sigificant importance to United States national interests, interests which the country is obligated to protect.

Instability. The common denominator of almost all U.S. thinking about Latin America is "instability." The issue of instability has dominated United States policy towards the region since World War II. During that time, the beliefs as to the causes of Latin American instability have undergone a perceptual evolution. Many in the post-WWII United States believed Latin American insurgencies were caused by direct Communist intervention in the various countries. They believed that without the Communists there would be no insurgencies in Latin America. This view has gradually given way to a perception that while Communists may contribute to such insurgencies and certainly do take advantage of deteriorating domestic situations, the root cause of insurgency in Latin America is poverty in its many manifestations. A refocused and revitalized Catholic Church including the practioners of liberation theology are now beginning to awaken the consciousness of Latin Americans to their poverty-stricken condition. As the campesino becomes aware of his situation, he demands action from his government to address his grievances. When he becomes frustrated by governmental inaction and elite intransigence, he often becomes radicalized and, thus, may become the willing recruit of Communist insurgents. Because both the Communists and the practioners of liberation theology are struggling against the existing unjust status quo, they are sometimes incorrectly assumed to be mutually supporting collaborators in the promotion of Latin American revolution.

U.S. Policy. The policy of the United States government towards Latin America has wafted from benign neglect to direct intervertion. The Good Neighbor policy of the Roosevelt era gave way to Kennedy's ambitious Alliance for Progress, a program ultimately grounded on the shoals of the Vietnam War. Current United States policy for the area is founded on four mutually supporting tenets--the "Four D's"-- Democracy, Dialogue, Development and Defense. The 1984 National Bipartisan Commission of Central America, the "Kissinger Commission," argued that indigeneous reform or even indigeneous revolution in Central America is not a security threat to the United States but that the intrusion of outside powers [the Soviet Union and its surrogates] trying to expand their political and military control of the area threaten both the United States and the entire hemisphere. The Commission recommended a series of socio-economic, political and military measures to attack the root causes of Central American insurgencies while also providing a security shield to protect the process.

Low Intensity Conflict. The situation in Central America and the Caribbean is clearly a form of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), an often protracted struggle at the low end of the conflict spectrum that seeks to achieve political, socio-economic or psychological objectives through various political, economic and military pressures to include guerrilla warfare. The United States currently is developing and refining its doctrine for Low Intensity Conflict. Prominent in the doctrine is the recognition of the overriding importance of the socio-political environment in an insurgency situation and the compelling need for the government to address the grievances of the populace, thereby denying the guerrillas the support of the populace. Despite the bitter experience of Vietnam, the "main battle area" in an insurgency remains the "hearts and minds" of the people.

Civic Action. From the military standpoint, a key element in gaining the support of the population in defeating an insurgency is military civic action, the active use of the military to build up a country's infrastructure, facilitate the development process and demonstrate to the people the concern of the government for their situation. In assulting poverty, ignorance and disease, the most effective military units are those from the combat support and combat service support branches. Such units are most effective because they have the capability to build roads, improve sanitary conditions and conduct other nation-building operations.

Systemic Coordination. The need for clear United States national objectives leading to a fully-coordinated counter-insurgency plan for each host country and its various regions involving multiple government and private agencies and groups concentrating on supporting the legitimacy of the government by effectively addressing the grievances of the people and assisting in the development of required economic infrastructure is manifest. Also evident is the need to adopt a systemic approach to insurgency that includes political, economic, psychosocial, and military components of society.

Use of Military in Civic Action. The use of military forces in civic action operations has long been recognized and used by both Communist and non-Communist countries to advance their national objectives. Latin American militaries, however, have engaged in civic action only

sporadically and with varying success. The United States has used its forces in successful, though limited, military civic action in Latin America for some time, working with local governments and military forces to provide concrete, convincing proof to rural populations that the government is concerned about their welfare. United States Reserve Forces have increasingly participated in such operations as an adjunct to overseas deployment training. United States Reserve Forces operating in Latin America receive valuable, real-world training in an often hostile, foreign environment under austere conditions emphasizing competence and self-reliance and leaving behind them tangible improvements in the daily lives of thousands of rural campesinos.

Capabilities of U.S. Reserve Forces. Having the bulk of the Army's engineer and hospital units, the Reserve Components are uniquely suited to military humanitarian/civic assistance operations in Central America and the Caribbean. Reserve Component soldiers, however, possess other attributes that enhance their utility in such operations. They bring with them a wealth of civilian skills not found in the active military; they are generally more mature than the active military forces; they can potentially provide continuing people-to-people links between Central American and Caribbean villages and local communities in the United States; and they provide first-hand feedback on the situation and environment directly back to the grass roots of America.

Policy Proposal. The entire post-WWII policy of the United States has been to seek to preserve the status quo in Central America and the Caribbean to ensure stability on the southern flank. Now, however, the Communists, by attacking an unjust status quo defended by an entrenched and often repressive oligarchy and by championing the rights of the impoverished masses, have staked claim to what many consider to be the morally high ground. It is within the power of the United States to reclaim the high moral ground in Latin America by concentrating its resources on eradicating the poverty, ignorance and disease that give rise to insurgencies. While the U.S. military does not have the ability to affect such a policy on its own, it can lead the way toward this goal by concentrating resources in military civic action operations using Reserve Component units and individuals in cooperative efforts with Central American and Caribbean local authorities aimed at alleviating the misery of the people. Toward this objective it is proposed that a STRATEGIC RESERVE COMPONENT MILITARY HUMANITARIAN/CIVIC

ASSISTANCE POLICY for the United States be articulated and an implementing program be instituted. This policy should be:

> *Relying primarily on its Reserve Component assets and proceeding with village-level concensus using appropriate technology, the United States will concentrate the maximum amount of military humanitarian/civic assistance possible at the most basic and local level practical to assist the rural campesino to improve his standard of living.*

Implementation. The implementation of such a strategic policy requires the expansion and possible redirection of on-going U.S. military civic action operations. It requires the National Guard and Reserve to be given the formal mission of military humanitarian/civic assistance in Central America and the Caribbean Basin. A formal mission tasking would allow the Reserve Components to undertake civic action projects, not as an adjunct to unit training, but as a mission unto itself, thus enabling them to apply their resources directly to the problems at hand without first establishing a cogent tie to mission-related training. With such latitude, the Reserve Components could utilize the myriad of civilian technical skills of their individual members as well as the collective skills of their units to attack the socio-economic roots of insurgency in the area.

OUTLINE

Dedication
Disclaimer
Abstract

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

...the Russians will win the world by their successes in a multitude of tiny battles... mainly they will take place in the minds of men. Only occassionally will the battles be violent: but the sum of these tiny battles will decide whether our way of life is to perish or persist...grand patterns are no more than the sum of their tinest parts, and it is on this basic level that we are losing the struggle.

Lederer and Burdick,
The Ugly American, 1958

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

South of the Rio Grande lies a vast and varied land. Latin America. From Tiajuana to Tierra del Fuego. the countries and peoples to the south represent a fascinating and often perplexing study in contrasts. It is an area with enormous human resources but with widely divergent local cultures and socio-economic conditions. The Spanish, British, French, Portugese and Dutch moulded unique societies in the Americas, leaving behind them strong cultural, socio-economic and political patterns which persist today. In the northern part of the region sits Central America and the Caribbean Basin, home to over 150 million proud but mostly poor, and often desperate, people. This region is beset with a variety of serious political, economic, psychosocial and military problems. Rampant poverty, gross inequities of income distribution, poor states of public health, inadequate educational systems, official corruption, narcotics trafficking and Marxist-Leninist opportunism are endemic.

The area has witnessed a series of extraordinary recent events which have catapulted it into the

international limelight. The Panama Canal treaties, the Nicaraguan revolution, the Salvadoran civil war, the Guatemalan insurgency, renewed Cuban activitism in revolutionary activities and the dramatic increase of Central American refugees into the United States and other countries have served to highlight the situation in Central America (Sereseres in Fauriol, 1985, p.10). The importance of the area and Latin America in general have become topics for heated debate. In the United States, political conservatives emphasize the geopolitical importance of the area citing Mexican oil, the Panama Canal and safety of Caribbean shipping lanes. Liberals turn their attention to alleged human rights violations by various Latin American governments and the need for land reform and elections (Berryman, 1987, p.3). There is no consensus on even the parameters of the national debate.

Policy proposals for the area range from interventionist to isolationist. Critics of current U.S. policy in the region regularly resurrect the spectre of the Vietnam debacle as both practical and moral justification for a U.S. "hands-off" attitude. At the opposite extreme, voices from the right are heard calling for direct U.S. military intervention; they, too, citing Vietnam but with the opposite conclusion that in the previous conflict the

military was bridled by confused civilian leadership and was prevented from gaining victory in a war it was fully capable of winning.

The region, of course, has not always been accorded such recognition. Schoultz (1987) notes

> Far from the site of world conflicts and tucked securely into the soft underbelly of the United States, until very recently Latin America remained isolated in the quite backwater of international relations. The fact that much of it sat rotting under the control of U.S.-supported tyrants did not bother many officials whose foreign policy interests were elsewhere. (p. 320)

Latin America, particularly Central America, now has moved from the backwater to center stage of international relations. Revolutionary changes are taking place in the area. Ratliff (in Fauriol, 1985) observes that "in recent years the Americas have seethed with the hope and fear of change" (p. 190). Many see such changes as threatening to the status quo with which the United States has been comfortable for many years. In fact, United States policy toward the area appears to some to be based on the <u>assumption</u> that Central American revolutionary movements are essentially Marxist in origin and that, should they gain victory, the resulting revolutionary government would likely align with the Soviet Union against the United States (Berryman, 1983, p.8).

Regardless of orgin, many see the growing instability

in the area as a direct threat to vital United States interests. Fauriol and Hoehn (in Fauriol, 1985) state

> ...insurgent activity has been inseparably linked to ideological forces hostile to the United States.... successive guerrilla victories have the potential for undermining United States interests throughout the region. (p.192)

Some (Decker, 1987) see the United States already at war in Latin America, struggling with the Soviet Union in a geopolitical battle for the area. He writes

> Several hundred years of desperation, despair and deprivation in traditional "have-not" societies have enabled the Soviet Union, through the use of its surrogates in Cuba and Nicaragua, to engage us indirectly and, thus far, successfully. (p.60)

Others see the United States as a crippled belligerent in the struggle, hobbled by a post-Vietnam "neo-isolationist" foreign policy and post-Watergate loss of national confidence (Ratliff in Fauriol, 1985, p. 174).

Central to the debate is an identification of the actual United States strategic security interests in the area and a delineation of an appropriate United States policy to protect such interests. Clearly, there is no national consensus on this issue either. Equally clear is the fact that during the Vietnam conflict the nation never reached agreement on these topics. The result was a factious body politic, deeply divided as to the purpose of the war and the U.S. interests at stake. Fifty-five

thousand American names inscribed in black granite on the Washington Mall attest to the consequences of the lack of national consensus.

Central America itself lies in the shadow of Vietnam and in the eye of the storm. Many there see themselves as "victims of the global pretentions, ideological ambitions, and parochial interests of actors outside the region" (Sereseres in Fauriol, 1985, p. 100), unwilling players in global power politics.

While the winds of change are blowing through the region with increasing velocity, it is sobering to note that the gathering storm has been building for some time. LaFeber (1984) quotes a 1964 "Survey of Latin America" produced by the United States Central Intelligence Agency as stating

> The hazards of governing may be increasing rather than lessening in Latin America. The principal reasons are: the pressures among organized groups and peoples for positive and radical changes in the inequitable and backward socio-economic structures and for gains in levels of living are mounting steadily. In many areas, inflation has caused a deterioration in levels of living. Moreover, political and popular demands for accomplishments in short periods of time are irrational and unrealistic. Political parties and candidates who attain power by election as well as rulers who seize power extra-legally have stimulated popular aspirations which are impossible of attainment, even granted unlimited resources and extensive periods of time. In part because of the Latin American tradition, the public blames governments for most evils and failures, while both governments and peoples look abroad for convenient scapegoats. (p.155)

The intervening twenty-four years have failed to allievate the situation. After two and a half decades, the winds of change are gusting with ever increasing ferocity, fanned now by Marxist-Lenisist opportunists anxious to exploit the situation to their own ends. The gathering revolutionary storm threatens to upset the existing status quo and replace it with a new order.

LaFeber (1984) states that revolutionary changes in Latin America are inevitable. The challenge for the United States is to understand the changes taking place in the area, analyze their root causes and probable consequences and formulate a reasonable policy that will balance its own long term strategic interests with the individual and collective interests of the peoples of the region.

To that end, this paper attempts to identify the strategic national interests of the United States in the region, examine the phenomena and causes of regional instability, review past United States policies in the area, outline the parameters of a developing United States doctrine for Low Intensity Conflict, and propose an expanded, strategic military humanitarian/civic assistance mission for United States National Guard and Reserve Forces, a mission of calculated compassion to alleviate the root causes of Latin American insurgency--poverty, social

injustice, ignorance and disease.

Chapter 2

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA

We have been offering the
Asian nations the wrong
kind of help. We have so
lost sight of our own past
that we are trying to sell
guns and money alone,
instead of remembering
that it was the quest for
the dignity of freedom
that was responsible for
our own way of life.

Lederer and Burdick
The Ugly American. 1958

Chapter 2

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA

In order to understand the national debate concerning United States policy in Latin America (to include the Caribbean Basin and Central America) it is necessary to ascertain the true strategic interests of the United States in the region. As with almost all other aspects of the debate, there is no consensus on exactly what such interests are and/or the extent to which United States interests in the area are indeed "strategic."

Many analysts state that U.S. interest in the region is justified out of concern for the region's natural resources, strategic location astride important transportation and communication routes and a high level of U.S. investment (Ratliff in Fauriol, 1985, p. 181). Others (Kaplan, 1983; Schoultz, 1987; U.S. Department of State, 1985) note that, for a variety of reasons, it is strategically important to deny military access to the area to the Soviets. Some state the United States should be concerned with the area because it is in its "backyard." Others (Gordon, 1986, p. 19), however, believe the "proximity" issue is important only in terms of its effect

on the flow of illegal immigration to the United States and its effect on the intentions of the Soviet Union to establish military bases in the region. Sereseres (in Fauriol, 1985, p. 106) maintains that in Central America, other than the Panama Canal, there are actually few truly strategic interests for the United States. But, in the broader context of the Caribbean Basin, he states, Central America becomes an important component of a Soviet strategy to erode the global position of the United States and divert U.S. military resources from other strategic areas (p.102). Schoultz (1987, p. 259) states that it is the Soviets' intention to disrupt the American strategic rear to consume U.S. resources.

The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (1984) explains that the direct United States national security interests in the region include preventing:

> --A series of developments which might require us to devote large resources to defend the southern approaches to the United States, thus reducing our capacity to defend our interests elsewhere
>
> --A potentially serious threat to our shipping lanes through the Caribbean
>
> -- A proliferation of Marxist-Leninist states that would increase violence, dislocation, and political repression in the region
>
> --The erosion of our power to influence events worldwide that would flow from the perception that we

were unable to influence vital events close to home

Examinining the diplomatic history of the region, Sereseres (in Fauriol, 1985, p. 100) points out that it has historicallv been strategicallv important to the United States and that this historic idea remains deeplv embedded in the mentalities of Washington policy makers.

He notes that United States interests in the area are threatened bv three important developments: 1) Low-Intensitv Conflict to include guerrilla warfare, terrorism from the left and the right, government repression and border conflicts, is spreading in the area: 2) Cuba and Nicaragua (with Soviet support) are activelv hostile to U.S. interests, thus, greatlv complicating U.S. defense planning in other areas of the globe which, in turn, affects global perceptions of U.S. militarv capabilitv: and 3) the Soviet and Cuban capabilitv to project power in the area is a destabilizing element (Sereseres in Fauriol, 1985, p. 102).

In a major, multi-year study of the beliefs of United States policv makers involving hundreds of interviews with policv makers both in and out of power, Schoultz (1987) determined that, in general, United States interests in the area can be analvzed in two broad areas: strategic access and strategic denial. Strategic access refers to the relative availabilitv of raw materials, militarv

cooperation, military bases, and secure lines of communication. Strategic denial refers to denying potential enemies access to the above.

Strategic Access

Raw Materials

The United States is the world's largest importer of unprocessed raw materials and is extraordinarily dependent upon a number of critically important raw materials (Scholutz, 1987, p. 141). General Ernest Graves (Schoultz, 1987, p. 147 citing U.S. Congress, Foreign Assistance Legislation for FY82), then Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency (the organization that administers United States military aid programs), testified to congressional committees that

> the United States and many of our allies have grown dependent on access to critical raw materials imported from Latin America--petroleum, natural gas, iron ore and bauxite to name a few...we can ill afford to run the risk of disruption of access to these critical raw materials. (p. 77)

The key to understanding the criticality of raw materials to the strategic well-being of the United States is to understand the term "strategic." There is, however, debate on its definition. The Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Revision Act of 1979, Public Law 96-41, Section 12, (Schoultz, 1987) states that

> Stategic and critical materials are materials that a) would be needed to supply the military, industrial and essential civilian needs of the United States during a national emergency and b) are not found in production in the U.S. in sufficient quantities to meet such need. (p. 148)

Schoultz (1987). however, criticizes such a defination as a "guns and butter" aproach that includes "essential civilian needs" and produces a bloated list of more than 45 nonfuel minerals from which the United States is dependent on foreign sources for twentv-six (p. 148).

The Government Accounting Office (Schoultz, 1987, p. 149 citing U.S. GAO, 1982, p. 5) states that the United States in vulnerable in 12 of 45 nonfuel minerals: Bauxite, chromium, columbian, gold, manganese, nickle, platinum-group metals, tantalum, tin, titanium and tungstun. He criticizes the GAO report as failing to adequately account for domestic supplies to include recycling and for not including Canadian supplies in the equation (p. 149).

The Congressional Research Service report, U.S. Economic Dependence of Six Strategic Non-Fuel Minerals, (Schoultz, 1987) identifies nonfuel minerals that are "1) essential for the production for military equipment, 2) not found or found only in small amounts in the U.S. and 3) for which substitutes are essentially unavailable" (p. 149). Schoultz (1987, pp. 149-151) uses the GAO defination to identify and give examples of military use of eight truly

strategically critical nonfuel minerals (bauxite, chromium, cobalt, columbium, manganese, platinum-group metals, tantalum and titanium) and a ninth important raw material, petroleum.

Bauxite. Ninety-four percent of the United States' bauxite supply is imported. Militarily, the mineral is used in vehicles and ammunition. It is essential to the production of aluminium. Each Pratt and Whitney F-100 engine for F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft uses 720 lbs of aluminium.

Cobalt. Cobalt is used to manufacture alloys for jet turbine blades and high stress aircraft structural components. Each F-100 aircraft engine contains 910 lbs of cobalt. The mineral is also used in missile controls, precision rollers and recoil springs for tanks. The United States has no productive capacity for cobalt.

Columbium. Used to manufacture alloys for aerospace use (an F-100 engine contains 171 lbs), the United States is 100% dependent on foreign imports.

Manganese. The United States imports 100% of its manganese needs. This mineral, essential in making steel, shares the distinction (with chromite) of not being found anywhere in the country.

Platinum-group Metals. Having only 1.3% of the

world's known reserves of these metals (platinum, palladium, iridium, osmium, rhodium and ruthenium), the United States must import 85% of its needs. Platinum-group metals are used in manufacturing sensitive electronic eqipment and in processing petrochemicals.

Tantalum. Having no substitute mineral, the United States is 100% dependent of foreign suppliers. Tantalum is used in control system capacitors of jet engines.

Titanium. Titanium sponge metal is essential for a variety of uses in aerospace applications. More than 80% of current U.S. titanium consumption is used in aircraft production (the F-100 jet engins contains 5,366 lbs and the B-1 bomber used 125 tons of titanium sponge metal). The United States, with only 1.4% of the world's known titanium reserves, imports almost all its needs.

There are a variety of mediating influences which impact on the criticality of these minerals. These include: 1) substitutes are sometimes available (one third of U.S. chromium consumption and 40% of cobalt production is replaceable by other minerals), 2) new reserves might be discovered, 3) U.S. consumption might be reduced (U.S. defense industries currently consume only 4% of all aluminium, 3% of the platinum-group metals, 5% of the manganese, 7% of the chromium and 17% of the cobalt used in

the country, 4) the U.S. has been stockpiling strategic minerals since 1966, 5) a partial loss of supply is more likely than a complete loss (few of the minerals come from a single source), and 6) demand could cease (zirconium and hafnium demand fell when utility companies stopped building commercial nuclear reactors) (Schoultz, 1987, p. 153).

Of the above eight strategically critical minerals, the United States imports four from Latin America (Schoultz, 1987, p. 154 citing U.S. Dept of Commerce, "U.S. Imports," 1981):

--16% of U.S. imported manganese (Brazil, 10%, and Mexico, 6%)

--17% of U.S. imported tantalum (especially from Brazil although there are 17 other suppliers including Canada, West Germany and Austria)

--33% of U.S. imported columbium (especially from Brazil)

--79% of U.S. imported bauxite (Jamaica, 52%, Surinam, 9%, Brazil, 6%, Guyana, 4%, Dominican Republic, 4% and Haiti, 2%)

In addition, approximately one-third of U.S. imported oil comes from Latin America (Mexico, 22%, and Venezuela, 10%).

He concludes that the United States is truly dependent on Latin American sources for only one of the essential commodities, bauxite (principally Jamaican); that Brazil supplies much columbium, manganese, tantalum and bauxite to the United States (but never more than one-third

of U.S. demand); that Mexico supplies significant amounts of petroleum and manganese; and Venezuela supplies a significant amount of petroleum. Schoultz concludes, therefore, that U.S. dependence on Latin America as a supplier of strategic raw materials is "fairly modest" with most supplies concentrated in Jamaica, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela (Schoultz, 1987, p. 156-157).

Military Assistance to U.S. Forces

Some argue that the United States needs to maintain its influence in Latin America in order to secure the assistance of Latin American military forces during future conflicts for purposes of "hemispheric defense." History has shown, however, that in a crisis situation each country will follow what it perceives to be its own best interests which may or may not coincide with those of the United States. Schoultz (1987, pp. 174-190) notes that with the notable exception of Brazil, Latin American participation in World War II was very modest. In the forseeable future, he states,

> only those armed forces whose very existance is dependent upon continuous infusions of U.S. aid--El Salvador and Honduras are the principal current examples --are believed to be ready to support the U.S. in a crisis. They are, however, unable to provide anything more than symbolic assistance. (p. 190)

Therefore, U. S. strategic contingency plans place little

reliance upon securing the assistance of Latin American militaries in any conflict situation that might have a significant impact upon the defense of the continental United States.

Military Bases

United States access to military facilities in the region, however, is strategically important. Schoultz (1987, pp. 160-166) catalogues what he considers to be the most important U.S. bases in the Caribbean Basin:

--Andres Island, Bahamas--has U.S. Navy's Underseas Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) to test anti-submarine equipment.

--Navy Sound Surveillance System (SONUS) sites are located in the Bahamas, Grand Turk, Sabana Seca in Puerto Rico, and on Antigua. These sites helps ensure that no submarine enters the Caribbean without the knowledge of the U.S. Navy. Strategically, for the United States, the SONUS sites in the Bahamas are the most important in the entire Caribbean.

--Puerto Rico--in addition to the SONUS site, has Roosevelt Naval Base, the Vieques range and five other military installations including Ramey Field (a former B-52 base).

--Guantanamo, Cuba--an undefensible, easily blockadeable military base of questionable strategic utility. The base is host to a Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA) and a Fleet Training Group (FTG) to train ships' crews in operations and maintenance. The justification for the continued existance of Guantanamo, however, appears to be more political than military.

Schoultz (1987, pp. 166-167) explains that the

largest concentration of U.S. military bases and personnel in Latin America is in Panama. The United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), headquartered at Quarry Heights, is responsible for the defense of the canal (a mission scheduled to cease in the year 2000), the support of U.S. military representatives throughout Latin America to include supervision of military aid programs and support of military advisory assistance groups (MILGPs, MAAGs and Mobile Training Team, [MTTs]), and coordinating U.S. exercises in the region. Stationed in Panama are the 9,000 man 193rd Infantry Brigade, a squadron of Air Force A-7 light attack jets and the 3rd Battalion/7th Special Forces Group (approximately 400 soldiers). The United States also maintains an electronic intelligence facility on Galeta Island; runs three Inter-American military networks (the Inter-American Military Network, Army; the Inter-American Telecommunications System, Air Force; and the Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network, Navy); supports the Inter-American Air Force Academy, Small Craft Instructors and Technical Team, the Inter-American Navy Telecommunications Network Training Facility and the Jungle Operations Training Center at Ft Sheridan, the only U.S. jungle warfare training facility (trains approximately 11,000 soldiers/year).

In Honduras, the United States maintains a temporary but indefinite presence at Honduras' Palmerola Air Force Base.

Schoultz (1987, pp. 173-174) concludes that the United States has only modest military facilities in Latin America and notes that the Department of Defense spends only 1/200 of its overseas personnel budget to staff U.S. facilities in Latin America. He states there are two reasons for the limited U.S. military in the region. First, few Latin American governments want U.S. bases on their territory. Second, there is broad consensus among U.S. defense policy makers that there is no need for more U.S. bases in the region and even a feeling that the few existing U.S. bases there expose the country to risks (riots, demonstrations, terrorists, hostages, etc) without contributing equally to United States security.

Sea Lanes of Communication

Gordon (1986, p.26) and others (National Bipartisian Commission on Central America, 1984; U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 1985 and 1986) argue that the Caribbean Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) are of vital strategic importance to the United States. During an emergency or

war. Soviet strategy, Gordon states, calls for making incursions into the Caribbean to threaten NATO's lifeline and arouse U.S. public opinion to demand a diversion of more U.S. forces to the Caribbean to prevent attacks on the U.S. mainland.

Schoultz (1987) acknowledges the importance of the Caribbean SLOCs to U.S. security but undertakes a more detailed analysis of the definition and role of SLOCs. Such an analysis is critical to gain an understanding of the geopolitical significance of the area to U.S. strategic interests.

He notes that the U.S. Department of Transportation has identified and numbered 64 standard United States ocean trade routes that are "essential to the promotion, development, expansion and maintenance of the foreign commerce of the United States" (Schoultz, 1987, pp. 191-192 citing U.S. DOT, U.S. Oceanborne Foreign Trade Routes, 1984, pp. vii-viii, 90). Of the 64 standard U.S. ocean trade routes, five begin or end in the Caribbean. Two of the five are of critical strategic importance: 1) U.S. East Coast-Caribbean route and 2) U.S. Gulf ports-Caribbean route. In 1982, the Gulf ports alone accounted for more than 50% of all U.S. seaborne trade (Scholutz, 1987, p. 200 citing U.S. DOT, pp. 186-187, 209, 212, 288, 292, 302-307

etc).

Schoultz (1987, pp. 204-211) argues that U.S. economic dependence on the Caribbean SLOCs are, however, in part a function of domestic political policies. He notes that if Congress did not require that Alaska North Slope oil be consummed domestically and be carried on U.S. flag carriers, the amount of petroleum transiting the Caribbean SLOCs would diminish. Additionally, the importance would decline further if East Coast cities would reverse themselves and grant permission for the construction of off-shore facilities to offload supertankers. Finally, the construction of a major pipeline from the Texas border to the Mexican oilfields would further eliminate shipping oil across water. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that political realities are a fact of life and, although political decisions could alter the importance of the Caribbean SLOCs. this probably will not occur.

The official U.S. government position on the importance of the Caribbean SLOCs has not changed since President Reagan, in introducing his 1982 Caribbean Basin Initiative stated "...nearly half our trade, two thirds of our imported oil and over half of our imported strategic materials pass through the Panama Canal or the Gulf of Mexico (Schoultz, 1987, p. 202 citing Weekly Compilation of

Presidential Documents, 18 Mar 1982, p. 219). In general, there appears to be concensus within policy making circles that the Caribbean SLOCs constitute a major economic lifeline for the United States.

Gordon (1986, p. 24) notes that the Caribbean SLOCs are of importance not only to the United States, but also to Western Europe. He observes that each year more than 25,000 ships pass through or skirt the Caribbean Basin. One half European imported oil and 25% of its food supply utilizes these routes. In addition, the Caribbean contains the strategic choke points through which 13 major trade routes lead directly to the Canal" (Schoultz, 1987, p. 199 citing Ryan, 1977, p. 48). Thus, the area has immense importance to the worldwide economy.

But, from a strategic standpoint, it is in the miltary equation that the Caribbean SLOCs are most important. Casper Weinberger, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, (Schoultz, 1987, p.203 citing U.S. Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress, FY83) has stated

> ...in wartime, half of NATO's supplies would transit by sea from Gulf ports through the Florida straits and onward to Europe. Much of the petroleum shipments and important reinforcements destined for U.S. forces in Europe would also sail from Gulf ports. The security of our maritime operations in the Caribbean, hence, is critical to the security of the Atlantic Alliance. (p. II-23)

Although some question the likelihood of an attack

against NATO shipping in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico or the inability of the U.S. Navy to protect such shipping (Schoultz, 1987, p. 212), others argue that such attacks must be taken into account and that air cover and naval protection for such shipping is essential (Gordon, 1986, p. 20).

Panama Canal

The economic importance of the Panama Canal to the U.S. economy is widely acknowledged. Sixty-five percent of the ships transiting the Canal carry goods to or from the United States (U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 1985, p. 5) Some, however, question the importance of the Canal to the strategic military security of the United States. Schoultz (1987, pp. 215-219) states that, the military importance of the Panama Canal in recent years has diminished greatly. He argues that the Navy's principal fighting units, the carrier battle groups, cannot use the Canal and that there are alternative routes for logistical resupply of American forces overseas. He notes also that in a war with the Soviet Union the Panama Canal "would be reduced to rubble in a matter of minutes" and that "no facility that is so vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack can be allowed to remain vital to U.S. security." Thus, he

argues. while the Panama Canal is an unquestioned convenience for U.S. military planners [and is of significant economic importance], it is no longer "essential" to U.S. military security.

Strategic Denial

Soviet Military Bases

The other side of the strategic coin for the United States is the question of strategic denial of access by the Soviet Union to influence and resources in the Caribbean region. Schoultz (1987, p. 229) states that many officials in the United States government greatly fear the establishment of Soviet military bases in the region from which they could project power into other areas. He acknowledges that the presence of Soviet military bases in the area would have significant military advantages for the Soviet Union particularly from a cost-effectiveness viewpoint. He states

> ...it is virtually impossible to mount a global naval policy without extended bases, for the absence of bases makes costing (sic) astronomical. The maintenance of an American base posture in the Caribbean and the exclusion of further Soviet basing involves in a vital way the entire cost structure of the American military establishment...Extended basing on the part of the Soviet Union sharply reduces the cost of Soviet naval threat and by correlation sharply increases the costs of American defensive operations. (Scholutz, 1987, p. 253 citing

Kaplan, 1983, p. 58)

A Soviet air base, Schoultz (1987, p. 58) notes would complicate U.S. defense planning by requiring the U.S. to reinforce its existing air defense and radar warning capability in the South. Additionally, such an air base could be used to provide close air support to ground forces of the Soviet Union [or its surrogate] as well as increasing the refueling capability of Soviet aircraft (p. 266).

The establishment of a Soviet naval base, however, would be the most problematical development from a strategic point of view. Schoultz (1987, pp. 254-257) contends that a Soviet submarine base in Latin America with facilities for replacement crews would 1) increase on-station time by 20-50%, thereby increasing fleet efficiency (the same number of submarines would produce more military capability or they could maintain the same capability using fewer submarines, thereby freeing up other submarines for other missions such as trailing U.S. carriers deploying out of Norfolk; such bases would be of more importance for attack submarines and older SSBNs); and 2) increase their ability to deploy their submarines secretly (would make it harder and more expensive for the United States to keep track of all its submarines).

Schoultz points out that the Soviets already have a military base in the Caribbean, Cuba. But, he contends,from

a strategic standpoint, because of the U.S. military dominance in the area, the Soviets cannot afford to place true strategic reliance on Cuba or on any other military base in Latin America (p.237). Thus, while acknowledging the importance of present or future Soviet bases in the area, he questions the degree of true strategic importance the Soviet Union places on such bases.

Soviet Bases for Subversion

More insidious and perhaps more feared than Soviet military bases in the region is the possibility of the creation of "additional platforms for regional subversion and Communist expansion, north to Mexico and south to Panama..." (U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 1985, p. 41). The spread of Communist subversion would, in the eyes of many, be greatly facilitated by the establishment of secure mainland bases.

Summary

Although debatable as to degree, there is no doubt that vital United States national interests are at stake in Cenral America and the Caribbean Basin. Raw materials, notably bauxite from Jamaica and oil from Mexico and

Venezuela, are strategically significant to the United States. Various military bases, to include those in Panama as well as the various Naval Sound Surveillance System sites scattered around the area, are militarily important. The area has sea lanes of communication and the Panama Canal, passages of strategic economic and considerable military importance to the United States. Finally, denial of the region to Soviet military access is of undeniable military importance. Even a critical examination reveals Central America and the Caribbean to have significant strategic importance to United States national interests, interests which the country is obligated to protect.

Chapter 3

INSTABILITY:

CONVERGING REVOLUTIONS

Before leaving Burma, Father Finian added a paragraph to his personal diary. "It is reassuring to learn that what is humane and decent and right for people is also attractive to them." he wrote. "The evil of Communism is that it has masked from native peoples the simple fact that it intends to ruin them. When Americans do what is right and necessary, they are also doing what is effective."

Lederer and Burdick
The Ugly American. 1958

Chapter 3

INSTABILITY: CONVERGING REVOLUTIONS

The common denominator in almost all U.S. thinking about Latin America is "instability." The issue of instability has dominated United States policy towards the region since World War II (Schoultz, 1987, pp. 11-13). Instability has most often been seen as antagonistic to United States interests and as something to be feared and fought. Recently, however, others have come to believe Latin American instability may be both inevitable and desirable, something to be understood and even carefully encouraged.

Hoehn and Weiss (in Fauriol, 1985, p. 39) state "Latin America is a developing region: with development comes change, and change is often accompanied by instability." They note that the potential for increased insurgent activity in the changing Latin American world is great and will constitute a challenge to the existing power base.

Schoultz (1987, p. 14) traces the post-World War II United States view of Latin American instability. During the Cold War period, he states, the virtually unanimous opinion among U.S. policy makers was that Latin Amercan

instability was caused by Communist adventurism and, if left unchallenged, would constitute a threat to United States security. Such a view, he writes, was a direct outgrowth of the Cold War policy of containment of Communism and reached its zenith in the mid-1950s with the U.S.-backed overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala.

Gradually, however, other causes of instability began to come to the fore. In 1953, Milton Eisenhower went on a fact finding visit to Latin America. He returned convinced that a root cause of the region's problems were grinding poverty and stunted economic development, problems with which the United States could help (Schoultz, 1987, p. 15). He stated

> Leaders of the nations to the South, recognizing that too many of their people are desperately poor, that widespread illiteracy is a handicap to progress, that educational and health facilities are woefully inadequate ...look to the United States for help. (Eisenhower, 1953, cited in Schoultz, 1987, p. 15)

During the 1960s, many policy makers gradually arrived at the opinion that, while Communist adverturism was a contributor, the primary cause of Latin American instability was actually the region's poverty. President Kennedy, perceiving two causes, devised two solutions, counterinsurgency programs (Special Forces, AID Office of Public Safety) to fight Communist insurgency and the Alliance for Progress to fight poverty (Schoultz, 1987, p.

19). Schoultz argues that such a policy was fundamentally flawed in that it assumed that "communists" and "the poor" were two separate groups. Policies designed to counter the former often alienated the latter.

During the late 1970s, Schoultz (1987, p. 21) notes, consensus on the causes and even importance of Latin American instability evaporated. He sees three groups now emerging from the debate. The first believes that instability is bad for U.S. interests and is caused by Communism. The second also believes that instability is bad but feels the root cause of instability in Latin America is poverty. The third, newer, group believes that instability is not necessarily bad for U.S. interests and that instability could lead to reforms within Latin American countries which, in turn, could lessen or end the deprivation and injustices of the region. He states that the emerging third group believes that long term United States security would be enhanced by the transformation of Latin American social and political systems to provide "greater equality in the distribution of political and economic resources" (p. 21).

Schoultz (1987, p. 21) states that this emerging third body of opinion is tantamount to revolution. The Latin American reforms necessary to effect a rapid reduction

of economic deprivation and political injustice would themselves be revolutionary. The reconstruction of the "existing structures of socioeconomic privilege" would inevitably lead to a period of chaos, ie. to instability. Many fear that during this unstable transition period Communists would seize the opportunity to take power. Thus, the emerging opinion that revolution is both inevitable and desireable for long term United States security interests flies in the face of all post-World War II U.S. policy towards the region. Nevertheless, Schoultz sees signs that such an opinion is gaining respect and, if it persists and prevails, will "change forever the face of United States policy toward Latin America" (p. 21).

Poverty and Injustice

The fact that poverty exists in Latin America is abundantly clear to the most casual observer. The causes and consequences of that poverty are perhaps not so evident. The U.S. Congress House Committee on Appropriations (Schoultz, 1987, p. 71) stated in 1981 "...the unrest we see in the region today is due in very large measure to the inequitable development patterns of the past and, in a number of coutries, the present." Hultman (1986) agrees, saying "internal dissatisfaction with social inequities,

economic deprivation and political isolation have given rise to many indigeneous insurgencies throughout the hemisphere" (p. 6).

Pervasive Poverty

In the more limited area of Central America, McEwin and Raddell (1986) state "The problem in Central America is not ultimately communism, the problem is starvation and ignorance" (p. 65). The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (1984) states "the commanding issue in all of Latin America is the impoverishment of the people" (p. 24). LaFeber (1984) argues that the fundamental reason why Central American peasants have joined insurgencies is "...not because they knew or cared anything about Marxism...[but]...because their children starved..." (p. 274). People struggling against starvation, ignorance and disease value political ideology only to the extent that it affects their own desperate condition.

Altimir (1982, quoted in Schoultz, 1987, p. 75) observes that

> Forty percent of households in Latin America live in poverty, meaning that they cannot purchase the minimum basket of goods required for the satisfaction of their basic needs, and...20% of all households live in destitution, meaning that they lack the means of buying even the food that would provide them with a minimally adequate diet. (p. 78)

Schoultz (1987, pp. 312-313) finds that today the majority of United States policy makers see poverty, not Communism, as the primary cause of instability in Latin America. He illustrates his findings as follows:



Distribution of Policy Makers' Beliefs
About Instability in Latin America,
circa 1980

Schoultz (1987, p. 317) notes that while the majority of policy makers agree with the liberals on the causes of instability, they agree with the conservatives on its effects on U.S. security.

Observing that policy makers in general believe that poverty is the first step along the road to instability (Schoultz, 1987) writes

> On four key beliefs there is a near perfect consensus: 1) Poverty is unjustifiably widespread in Latin America: 2) structural changes reduce the traditional passivity of the poor: 3) political mobilization heightens class tensions: and 4) elite intransigence makes instability inevitable. (p. 74)

Below, he diagrams the path by which poverty and injustice lead to instability in Latin America (p. 72).

Poverty as Cause of Instability



Revolution of Rising Expectations

Schoultz (1987, pp. 79-81) affirms that there is widespread agreement that poverty underlies instability in the region, but he retorically questions why peasants, who have suffered in silence poverty and political repression for centuries, have now suddenly decided to raise up in insurrection. He attributes the change to the "Revolution of Rising Expectations" spurred on by structural changes of the Latin American societies, particularly changes in transportation and communication. Berryman (1983, p. 10) agrees, stating that the expectations of the peasants have been raised by the church and development agancies. He notes, however, that the poor have often been frustrated by their lack of progress which, in turn, has led to militancy among the peasants.

The bridge between awareness of one's socio-economic condition and action to improve the situation is "political mobilization." Schoultz (1987) notes that in Latin America today the poor are forming grass roots organizations (many connected with the church and the ideas of liberation theology) ranging from cooperatives to neighborhood self-help communities and are "pushing themselves into the political system" (p. 87).

Some see the political mobilization of the poor as a

direct threat to the stability of the region and as the building blocks for Communist insurgencies. While not condemning peasant organizations, Ambassador Robert White (1982, quoted in Schoultz, 1987, pp. 91-92), former U.S. ambassador to El Salvador, has testified that

> The guerrilla groups, the revolutionary groups, almost without exception began as associations of teachers, associations of labor unions, campesino unions or parish organizations which were organized for the definite purpose of getting a schoolhouse up on the market road. (p. 228)

Elite Intransigence

Unfortunately, the emergence of peasant organizations and the political mobilization of the poor has often been met by elite intransigence, an unwillingness by the governing minority to make the changes in the socio-economic structures of their societies to satisify the needs of the peasants. A common response of the entrenched oligarchy to the demands of the impoverished but politically vocal peasantry has often been brutal repression (Chance, 1984; Christian, 1986; Davis, 1987; LaFeber, 1984).

As a result of elite intransigence, many peasants have become radicalized and have joined insurgencies. Berryman (1987) states that as governments responded with increased repression "...many people felt they had little to lose by supporting the insurgents" (p. 105). General John

R. Galvin (1986) former commander of the United States Southern Command, acknowledges that "political stress and social frustrations have fed the insurgent movements" (p. 8). There seems little doubt that poverty and political injustice are inextricably interwound as causes of Central American insurgencies.

Summarizing the path from poverty to insurgency, Berryman (1983) explains

> As existing forms of action (elections) proved impotent, people formed new militant organizations, and as these were met with violence they became more united and eventually joined with guerrilla organizations which, while largely Marxist, are genuinely Central American... (p. 17)

There is an imperative need for vast changes in the socio-economic structures of many Latin American nations today to alleviate the grinding poverty and the social and political injustices of the past. Unfortunately, the ruling elites appear reluctant to make such reforms. In their intransigence, they may be making prophetic the words of President Kennedy..."Those who make reform impossible make revolution inevitable" (Schoultz, 1987, p. 94).

Communism

Since the end of World War II, the linchpin of United Stated global foreign policy has been the containment of Communism. In practical terms, it has not been Communism

per se that has been seen to threaten the United States. but the militarv power of the Soviet Union. Anv discussion of the role of Communism in Latin American insurgencies and the consequences for U.S. securitv must focus then on the role of the Soviet Union.

Strategic End Run

To manv U.S. policv makers, the Soviet Union is activelv engaged in a strategic end run on the United States in Latin America to the ultimate detriment of U.S. securitv. There is no doubt the Soviets are penetrating Latin America. Before World War II, the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with onlv two Latin American nations. Mexico and Uruguay. Now, they have established ties with all the major Latin American nations and numerous lesser states as well (Fauriol. 1985, p. 5-6). Alexander and Kucinski (in Fauriol, 1985. p. 59) argue that the Soviets are attemoting to erode United States leadership in Latin America and to challenge U.S. geostrategic interests. "The deliberate fomentation of conflict in alreadv troubled areas." thev write. "is an imoortant instrument of Soviet global strategv" (p. 59). Ratliff (1985. pp. 166-167) states that the Soviet's long range goal is the creation of a Marxist-Lennist Latin America; their near term goal being

merely to encourage the establishment of anti-U.S. governments in the area, thus forcing the United States to redeploy military forces to the Caribbean Basin.

Understandably, many U.S. policy makers are concerned about Soviet intentions in Latin America. The United States Departments of State and Defense (1985) position is that the Soviet Union "working through its proxy...Cuba...hopes to force the United States to divert attention to an area that has not been a serious security concern to the United States in the past" (p. 2). Schoultz (1987) notes that "it is difficult to overemphasize the extent to which this view of Soviet Communism as an evil, expansionary force has pervaded many officials' perceptions of instability in Latin America" (p. 112). There is an implicit assumption in the minds of many policy makers that Latin American instability is caused by or at least closely linked to Soviet expansionism. The Center for Low Intensity Conflict (1984) notes that "while the Soviets are not responsible for all conflict in the world, they are adept at exploiting an otherwise indigeneous conflict" (p. 4).

The Soviet LIC Weapon

For the Soviet Union, low-intensity conflict (terror, insurgencies and revolutions) is an extremely cost

effective method of power projection (Kuster, 1987, p. 23; U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 1985, p. 2). Their "modus operandi" throughout the 1970s and 1980s has been to use surrogate powers to orchestrate local insurgencies. The weapons used--small arms, demolitions, and communication equipment--are inexpensive in superpower terms and can easily be infiltrated into a target country without risk to the supplier. Alexander and Kucinski (in Fauriol, 1985, p. 60) note that the Soviets also prefer to advance their aims through low-intensity conflict because they feel it safer and less costly than either nuclear or conventional war. The Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project (1986, pp. 2-5 and 2-6) echos this view, stating that the Soviet Union, unwilling to pursue a general war strategy, has chosen to fight on the low end of the conflict scale, to rely on indirect force to project its power and to attain its national strategic goals.

Historical Context and Anti-U.S. Sentiment

Given the United States' aversion to Communism, some note that it has been easy to blame Latin American instability on Communist agitation. LaFeber (1984) states that "as large parts of Central America flashed into class conflict, the United States easily blamed the crisis on

Communists and other outside influences. That explanation ignored more than a century of history" (p. 270). Berryman (1983) believes the preoccupation of U.S. policy makers with the spectre of Communism has clouded the proper perspective of the problem. "...all previous history," he writes, "many well-documented atrocities, the objections of other nations--all are shoved aside as irrelevant in the face of 'communist expansionism'" (p. 16).

Even though they may not all be Communists, there is no doubt that virtually all Latin American insurgents share the common trait of being anti-U.S. Many see the United States as a reactionary force working with local elites to maintain the status quo, the situation they themselves are working (and in many cases fighting) to reform. To many, there is a historical basis for this view. In the view of many Latin American radicals, Schoultz (1987) writes, the historical role of the United States in Latin American revolutions is as follows:

> The marines storm ashore, shoot the radicals, spray for mosquitos and revitalize the local rum industry. Meanwhile, U.S. negotiators search out the most despicable humans in the country, often identified by their ability to speak English. Once the right individual has been selected from among the pool of qualified traitors, the marines reembark, leaving the country to rot for another generation. (p. 129)

Nevertheless, there is solid basis for the fear of many U.S. policy makers that Latin American revolution may

lead to a Communist government hostile to the U.S. Even a revolution that does not begin as a Communist insurgency can quickly become one. Peters (1986) notes that "successful insurgencies have, more often than not, been home-grown--at least in their initial phases. The most dangerous Soviet talent has been exploiting the success of others" (pp. 22-23). Schoultz (1987) argues that "...the Soviets are opportunists, ready to take advantage of instability to increase their influence..."(p. 138).

He also notes a consistent pattern in United States relations with Latin American radicals:

> A popular Latin American radical announces his attraction to Marxism, then does or says something either (a) hostile to the United States or (b) friendly toward the Soviet Union. This is taken as evidence that the radical is not a harmless Marxist (a'la Francois Mitterrand) but a dangerous Communist (a'la Joseph Stalin). Given this perception, the United States then moves to protect its security by neutralizing the threatening radical. (p. 131)

As examples of this scenario in action, Schoultz cites "Guatemala against Arbenz, Cuba against Castro, Brazil against Goulart, Chile against Allende, Grenada against Bishop and Nicaragua against the Sandinistas" (p. 131). Given the widespread U.S. distrust of Communism, there seems little chance this pattern will change without a complete reevaluation of United States policy.

Of the People, but not For the People

Many Latin American insurgent leaders, Ratliff (in Fauriol, 1985, pp. 164-165) states, are anti-US and indeed claim to be Marxists or Marxist-Leninists fighting on behalf of "the people." But few, he observes, are willing to allow the "people" to share in the decision-making process once victory has been obtained. The Center for Low Intensity Conflict (1987) notes "the insurgents secure support by promising freedom from repression and then once the insurgents take power they impose far more repressive governments" (pp. 9-10). The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (1984) observes

> Because the Marxist-Leninist insurgents appeal to often legitimate grievences, a popular school of thought holds that guerrilla leaders are the engines of reform. They characteristically reinforce this by inviting well-meaning democratic leaders to participate in a Popular Front, taking care, however, to retain in their own hands a monopoly on the instruments of force. If the insurgents were, in fact, the vehicles for domestic and social progress, the entire security issue would be moot; they would no longer be the problem, but rather the solution.
>
> Unfortunately, history offers no basis for such optimism. No Marxist-Leninist "Popular Front" insurgency has ever turned democratic after its victory. Cuba and Nicaragua are striking examples. Regimes created by the victory of Marxist-Leninist guerrilas become totalitarian. That is their purpose, their nature, their doctrine, and their record. (p. 8)

The lack of democratic participation in post-revolutionary governments confirms to many U.S. policy makers the

Communistic intentions of the insurgents.

The classic case often cited by backers of the theory of Communist subversion of on-going, popular revolutions is Cuba. Hoehn and Weiss (in Fauriol, 1985, p. 13) observe that Cuba actually had two revolutions. The first was a broad-based reaction to the corrupt and politically repressive Batista regime. However, after the Batista government collapsed on December 31, 1958, a second revolution took place and a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship was installed in marked contradiction to many of the original ideals of the Cuban Revolution. In subsequent years, Fidel Castro failed to follow through on promises to diversify the economy, systematically abused human rights and made Cuba more dependent upon the Soviet Union than it ever had been on the United States.

Despite the turn of the Cuban Revolution and the current state of Cuba's economic and political health, LaFeber (1984) notes that many Latin Americans admire Castro purely because of his "nationalism and successful defiance of the United States" (p. 194).

The Cuban Connection

Cuba has taken an active role in encouraging insurgencies in Latin America (LaFeber, 1984). It has

supported revolutions against both democracies (Betancourt in Venezuela) and dictators (Somoza in Nicaragua)(Ratliff in Fauriol, 1985, p. 166). In recent years, it is alleged that (encouraged by the Soviets) it has joined with other outside influences such as Lybia, the PLO, North Korea and Vietnam in promoting revolution in Latin America (Alexander and Kucinski in Fauriol, 1985, p. 42; Binder, 1987, p. 39; Galvin, 1986, p. 8; Hoehn and Weiss in Fauriol, 1985, p. 20; U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 1985, p. 37).

There is little doubt the Soviet Union and Cuba have encouraged and exploited Latin American insurgencies. But there is considerable debate as to whether or not the insurgencies would have blossomed even without this support. Ratliff (in Fauriol, 1985) writes "...in several important instances Cuba has played a significant role in organizing, focusing, expanding, and publicizing the domestic discontent" (p. 175). In other words, he argues that Cuba repeatedly has seized upon an untenable domestic situation and has become involved in insurgencies in order to exploit the "opportunities" to its own ends.

Berryman (1983, pp. 13-14), however, warns that is is a mistake to focus exclusively on the guerrilla in an insurgency and fail to ascertain the underlaying causes for which he fights. Ratliff (in Fauriol, 1985) notes that

"...Cuba did not create the poverty, corruption and oppression that, in varying degrees, plague so many countries in the region...there would be dissident individuals and forces even if Cuba offered no assistance whatsoever" (p. 175).

The Drug Connection

A sinister third element has begun to appear on the Latin American insurgency scene, drug money. It is alleged that today's insurgents not only receive financing from the Soviets (through Cuba) but are increasingly earning money through drug trafficking activities (Binder, 1987, p. 38: Galvin, 1986, p. 7: *Graham*, 1988, p. 1: Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project, 1986, pp. 2-3). The drug money is used both to buy weapons for the insurgents and to corrupt government officials, thereby weakening the governmental infrastructure and its ability to deal with the insurgency.

Formula for Revolution

It seems evident that the salient ingrediants for modern Latin American insurgencies are poverty and injustice exacerbated by Communist opportunism and funded, in part, by illicit drug money. It is dangerous, however, for the United States to focus too narrowly on but a part of the

equation. Ambassador White (Schoultz, 1987, p. 137 citing U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 1981) warns

> ...it is a grave and, if we continue it, fatal error to believe that we are confronting primarily a case of Communist aggression in Central America. What we are basically confronting is an authentic revolution, born out of despair and discouragement because of a lack of economic opportunity and because of a distortion of the political process. (p. 28)

It can be argued that it is in the long term interests of the United States to heed the advice of Ambassador White and to analyze and address the causes, not the symptoms, of the cancer of Latin American insurgency.

Liberation Theology and the Revolution of Rising Expectations

To some, liberation theology is Theology; to others, it is Revolution. One cannot attempt to understand Latin America today without also understanding the growing influence of liberation theology upon events as they are unfolding. Considered by some to be potentially as significant as the Protestant Revolution, the theology of liberation and human emancipation is pervasive in its influence (Berryman, 1987, pp. 6-7) and promises to have a profound effect upon the entire Latin American socio-political equation.

No less a revolutionary than Che Guevarra has observed that "when Christians dare to give full-fledged revolutionary witness, the Latin American revolution will be inevitable" (Berryman, 1987, p. 28). What we are witnessing today is a convergence of the rhetoric of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries with the sincere beliefs of growing numbers of Latin American Christians that there is sound Biblical basis for making radical changes in the existing, inequitable structures of society. A grass-roots revolution is in the making and Marxists-Leninists are standing in the wings ready to turn inevitable chaos to their own advantage.

Theology of Social Criticism

Put simply, liberation theology is "an interpretation of Christian faith out of the experience of the poor" (Berryman, 1987, pp.4-5). The focus of the theology is upon the life of Jesus and his message. The poor, through scriptural study, come to understand their individual self-worth and personal dignity and their right to seek a better life not only in the next world, but in the present. Inevitably, the outcome of such study is a critical evaluation of the present forces in society responsible for their economic deprivation and political injustice.

"Liberation theology," Berryman (1987) explains, "is a critique of economic structures that enable some Latin Americans to jet to Miami or London to shop while most of their fellow citizens do not have safe drinking water" (pp. 4-5).

McEwen and Reddell (1986) view liberation theology as "an amalgam of Marxist social criticism with a reintrepretation of Christian prophetic tradition emphazing social action" (p. 64). The mention of Marxism causes many observers to question the basis of the theology. Some, in fact, dismiss liberation theology as merely a Marxist subterfuge that wraps its revolutionary message in a Christian gown. There seems little doubt that the actions advocated by adherents of liberation theology parallel many of those proposed by Communist insurgents. Others argue, however, that the ideological motivations of the two groups are entirely different, coinciding, not in their fundamental bases, but only on the targets of their criticisms.

LaFeber (1984) states that for centuries the Catholic Church had been one of the pillers of the status quo in Latin America but, following the encyclicals of Pope John XIII in 1961 and 1966, Vatican II in 1963-65, and the Second General Conference of Latin American Bishops in Medellin, Colombia in 1968, the Church became "an engine for

(religious) revolution" (pp. 219-220). The focus of the Church in Latin America shifted from the rich to the poor. A major historical fissure had occurred, the tremors of which are now being felt.

Gustavo Gutierrez, a Peruvian theologian and one of the advisors at the Medellin Conference, has profoundly influenced the development of liberation theology. Gutierrez sees "dehumanizing poverty as an offense against God" and urges priests to see poverty as an evil, "to protest against it and to struggle to abolish it" (Berryman, 1987, pp. 32-33). It is in the struggle against poverty that liberation theology has encountered its most vigorous opposition for the theology sees poverty as resulting from the manner in which society is structured: to alleviate "dehumanizing poverty" requires changes in the structure of society which requires the mobilization of the poor into political action...a mobilization often opposed by those benefitting from the status quo.

Consciousness Raising

Berryman (1987) presents an in-depth examination of the phenomenon of liberation theology. He explains (pp. 35-37) that, at the grass roots level, political action results from a process which begins with "consciousness

raising," guiding peasants to an awareness of their own worth, their own situation and their ability to change it. Building upon the work of Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, adherents of liberation theology start with the assumption that the poor are intelligent adults and, in a non-paternalistic manner, use the Socratic method to teach the peasants using examples from the impoverished experiences of the campesinos themselves.

As an example of consciousness raising at the village level, Berryman (1987) paints a picture of a typical encounter. He says,

> Imagine a village of some seventy-five houses which we will call Palo Seco. It sits in the hills some twenty kilometers by dirt road from the nearest town, San Jeronimo. For some time the pastor and sisters from the parish have been visiting the village and familiarizing themselves with its inhabitants. Now a group of people has agreed to attend a series of meetings.
>
> The people are sitting on rough benches on the dirt floor of a small community center, most of them barefoot or in sandals, scrawny, somewhat shy. The woman who is to lead the discussion is an outsider. The only sign she is a nun is the wooden cross she is wearing. For a while Sister Elena makes small talk with the people. Then she prefaces the meeting by emphasizing that the idea is not for her to act like a teacher but rather for all of them to talk to each other as equals, since everyone has something worthwhile to contribute from his or her own experience.
>
> She begins the session with an open-ended question. "Is there evil and injustice in the world?" People nod and say yes, but then there is silence, so she encourages them to bring up examples and they tell stories of political graft or other forms of injustice. With probing questions she gets them to examine some of these

examples, and the discussion ranges over what injustice means. After forty-five minutes or so she says she would like to show an example of injustice from the Bible and slowly reads the narrative of Cain and Able. The conclusion is that injustice is rooted in what the Bible calls "sin"--that is, when human beings refuse to care for their brothers and sisters and even go so far as to kill them.

In the next session the opening question is simply "What is God like?" Again there is an initial silence. With some encouragement people begin to draw out notions passed on through traditional catechism and the culture itself, such as the image of God as "Supreme Being," someone who is "always watching," a "Judge," or perhaps the image of "Father." After some discussion of the implications of some of these ideas, Sister Elena again brings out the Bible, this time to read from the third chapter of Exodus where God appears to Moses and says:

"I have witnessed the affliction of my people in Egypt and have heard their cry of complaint ...so I know well that they are suffering. Therefore, I have come down to rescue them from the hands of the Egyptians and lead them out of that land into a good and spacious land" [3:7-8].

She outlines the exodus narrative and they discuss what it means to say God hears the cry of his oppressed people and whether it is still valid today. (pp. 38-39)

Berryman (1987) explains that the evangelism of liberation theology is communicating the 'Good News' that "God hears the cry of the poor and is with them in their suffering and struggle" (p. 41).

Applying the Scriptures to the actual world, Berryman (1987) states that when peasants read Mich 2:2, "They covet fields, and seize them: houses, and take them; they cheat an owner of his house, a man of his inheritance." and see it as describing the generals and landowners who have seized their

land (p. 51).

But, according to the theology of liberation, man is not meant to suffer oppression, spiritually or physically. They cite Paul as writing "It was for liberty that Christ freed us. So stand firm, and do not take on yourselves the yoke of slavery a second time" (GAL 5:13-14); and later, "My brothers, remember that you have been called to live in freedom... Out of love, place yourselves at one another's service. The whole law has found its fulfillment in this one saying 'You shall love your neighbor as yourselves.'" (GAL 5:13-14).

It is in the sharing of one's self with others that the followers of liberation theology find the criterion for a just life, a criterion to be applied both personally and to society as a whole.

> For I was hungry and you gave me food. I was thirsty and you gave me drink. I was a stranger and you welcomed me, naked and you clothed me. I was ill and you comforted me, in prison and you came to visit me...I assure you, as often as you did it for one of my least brothers, you did it for me (MATT 25:35-36, 40).

Traditionally, Berryman (1987, p. 57) explains, the Church was viewed as detached from the people; a priest, a cathedral but little real contact at the local level. Citing Matthew 18:20 ("Where two or three are gathered in my name, there I am in their midst."), the liberation theologists teach that the people themselves are the Church and are not dependent upon the trappings of tradition.

Christian Base Communities

Liberation theology perhaps has received at once its greatest acclaim and harshest condemnation for its work in establishing "communidades eclesiales de base," "Christian Base Communities." These, Berryman explains, are "small, lay-led communities, motivated by Christian faith, that see themselves as part of the Church and that are committed to working together to improve their communities and to establish a more just society" (p. 64). Adherents of liberation theology see such communities as being closer to the original Christian Church than is the traditional Catholic Church with its large parishes and anonymous congregations. Their Scriptural basis is ACTS 4:32-35,

> The community of believers were of one heart and one mind. None of them ever claimed anything as his own; rather, everything was held in common...nor was there anyone needy among them, for all who owned property or houses sold them and laid them at the feet of the apostles to be distributed to everyone according to his need.

In the "communidades de base," Berryman (1987, p. 68) states, religion and social activities tend to mesh: Bible study often will be followed by discussion of cooperative action for the village. It is a short step, then, to group organization and political action. Liberation theology takes the view that "faith cannot be neutral when life and death of people are in question" and that politics and ideology cannot

be sidestepped (Berrvman. 1987. p. 129).

It is here that the base communities of liberation theologv have encounted their most vociferous criticism. To the peasant, there is a direct connection between the awakening of his mind to his situation through the Gospel, the organizing of his village for self-help projects, and the joining of a national peasant organization. Armies and police, Berrvman (1987, p. 64) states, have often been suspicious of the base communities and in manv cases have targeted them for repression. The peasants, in turn, have become increasinglv militant and radicalized.

It is in the ferment of a frustrated peasantrv, to include those of the Christian base communities, that Communist opportunists have implanted their message and begun their struggle "for the people." Berrvman reports one Nicaraguan organizer as stating that the Sandinistas "regarded the base communities as 'quarries' for their own organizing" (p. 74). Manv share their view that in Central America the base communities have "prepared the soil for grass roots organizing and revolutionary struggle" (pp. 72-73).

Radicalization

Lack of success in gaining redress of their grievances through the established political process has driven peasants

to militancy. "How 'democratic' is a society," Berryman (1987) asks, "where all the mechanisms are in place--parties, elections, Congress--but no serious proposals for reform are allowed on the agenda" (p. 185). Faced with such inertia, both peasants and their organizers have become frustrated. Berryman continues

> Christians who started out trying to apply the church's "social teaching" have tended to become radicalized. They realize that justice will not be achieved without systematic political change. The essential political issue is not which party should occupy a government, when all are operating within the parameters laid down by oligarchial and military elites. It is rather how the rules of the game can be changed so that the poor can themselves become players. (p. 128)

The process of radicalization can take many forms--forms sometimes leading to violence. Father Camilo Torres, a Colombian priest, frustrated by rampant injustice and elite intransigence and concluding that traditional politics controlled by the oligarchy could not result in significant change, called for a revolution, a "fundamental change in economic, social and political structures" (Berryman, 1987, p. 18). The priest stated that the revolution was

> ...the way to bring about a government that feeds the hungry, clothes the naked, teaches the ignorant, puts into practice the works of charity and love for neighbor, not just every now and then, and not just for a few but for the majority of our neighbors. (p. 18)

Father Torres joined the guerrillas and died in combat in 1966.

The path down which many peasants and workers from the

base communities as well as the secular poor have often traveled has been one of realization, organization, politicalization, frustration and radicalization.

Summary

The causes of Latin American instability has undergone a perceptual evolution. Many in the Post-WWII United States believed Latin American insurgencies were caused by direct Communist intervention in the various countries. They believed that without the Communists there would be no insurgencies in Latin America. This view has gradually given way to a perception that while Communists may contribute to such insurgencies and certainly do take advantage of deteriorating domestic situations, the root cause of insurgency in Latin America is poverty in its many manifestations. A refocused and revitalized Catholic Church including the practioners of liberation theology are now beginning to awaken the consciousness of Latin Americans to their poverty-stricken condition. As the campesino becomes aware of his situation, he demands action from his government to address his grievences. When he becomes frustrated by governmental inaction and elite intransigence, he often becomes radicalized and, thus, may become the willing recruit of Communist insurgents. Because both the Communists and the practioners of liberation theology

are struggling against the existing, unjust status quo, they are sometimes incorrectly assumed to be mutually supporting collaborators in the promotion of Latin American revolution.

Chapter 4

RECENT UNITED STATES POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA: DIMENSIONS AND DEBATE

"Why Homer." Emma said. "with all that money you've got in the bank in Pittsburgh. why don't you just give some of it to these Sarkhanese?"

Atkins looked up sharply...

"You know why. Whenever you give a man something for nothing the first person he comes to dislike is you. If the pump is going to work at all. it has to be their pump. not mine."

Lederer and Burdick
The Ugly American, 1958

Chapter 4

RECENT UNITED STATES POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA: DIMENSIONS AND DEBATE

The policy of the United States government towards Latin America has wafted from benign neglect to direct intervention. LaFeber (1984, p. 300) outlines the changing currents of U.S. policy. In this century the "gunboat diplomacy" of the 1920s gave way to the Good Neighbor policy of the 1930s, a policy of economic leverage supporting United States economic interests. With the changes sweeping Latin America in the wake of Castro's revolution in Cuba, the Good Neighbor policy was replaced by the Alliance for Progress, an attempt at cooperative economic development and modernization of Latin America.

Alliance for Progress--Revolution and Disillusion

President Kennedy appreciated the critical role of nation-building in combating the spread of Communism in the hemisphere. In his famous "ask not what your country can do for you" speech he also urged "my fellow citizens of the world, ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man." (Kennedy, 1961, in World Almanac, Eds., 1987, p. 60). Putting words to

action in Latin America, he launched the Alliance for Progress.

> ...a bold and unprecedented effort to encourage comprehensive national planning and to promote a wide array of social, political, tax and land reforms (including) the establishment of agricultural cooperatives, housing projects, roads, health centers, population assistance, and technical training. (National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, 1984, p. 36)

Kennedy believed that Fidel Castro would continue to attempt to create "little Vietnams" in Latin America and that the U.S. response, focused on denying the revolutionaries a fertile terrain for exploitation, should be as much political and economic as military (Child in Fauriol, 1985, p. 133).

The Alliance was a massive effort involving a planned $100 billion in Latin American development over 10 years, 80% of which would be financed by the Latin American nations themselves. The economic goal was a net increase in actual, post-inflation gross national product of 5.5%. Igniting public support throughout Latin America, President Kennedy urged "Let us again transform the (hemisphere) into a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts" (LaFeber, 1984, p. 148 citing Public Papers of the Presidents--John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 175).

The Alliance for Progress was promulgated as the United States response to the Revolution of Rising

Expectations sweeping Latin America. But desoite the rhetoric of revolution, LaFeber (1984) states that under the Alliance. "Demands for revolution were to be met with evolution" (p. 149).

Unfortunately, geopolitical events as well as internal inconsistencies and deficiencies in Alliance plans led to its demise (LaFeber. 1984, pp. 157-159). With the Vietnam War raging in Southeast Asia. President Johnson sharply curtailed economic aid to Latin America. Two of the Alliance's origial goals (democratization and social change) were, in effect, dropped. The new industries that were created were in the hands of the oligarchy, thereby heightening income maldistribution and and further concentrating wealth and power (CIA. 1964, cited by LaFeber. 1984. p. 175). Some argue that the Alliance for Progress actually weakened the stability of Latin America by contributing to a great rise in the expectation of the masses while fortifying the power and wealth of the existing oligarchies. Feeding on the frustration of unfulfilled expectations, revolutionary groups multiplied.

The fight against Communists came more and more to rely on the military with countries depending increasingly on a U.S. trained and supplied military establishment to maintain order. As the military forces grew in power so did

their political aspirations. Between 1961 and 1966 there were nine military coups in Latin America. It is here that LaFeber (1984) places the blame for the demise of the Alliance stating "while promising 'revolution' the United States trained armies and police to prevent revolutions. The tensions between the two parts of the policy built until it helped destroy the Alliance" (p. 155).

The Nixon Doctrine

During the height of the Vietnam War, President Nixon expressed a new guiding principal for United States foreign policy, the Nixon (or Guam) Doctrine of 1969. The doctrine stated that the United States would defend international peace, development and security but that the principal burden of defense rested with the ally (Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project, 1986, p. 3-2). The Nixon Doctrine provided the foundation for current U.S. policy in Latin America.

The Reagan Doctrine and the "Four D's"

President Reagan has introduced into United States foreign policy a new concept, the "rollback principle." The principle holds that the United States will support Third World nationalist groups attempting to overthrow a

Marxist-Leninist government (Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project, 1986, p. 3-4). Under this policy, the United States has supported the mujahidin in Afganistan, Savimbi's guerrillas in Angola and the contras in Nicaragua. The United States, however, will not intervene directly in such conflicts with its own combat forces.

In Latin America, United States official policy is based on the "Four D's": Democracy, Development, Dialogue and Defense. These four interlocking principlas constitute broad presidental objectives for a United States Latin American strategy (Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project, 1986, p. 3-6, 6). The objectives of each are as follows:

> Democracy--To actively support democracy, reform, and human freedom against dictators and would-be dictators of both left and right.
>
> Dialogue--To foster dialogue and negotiations--a dialogue of democracy within countries; a diplomacy of negotiations among nations willing to live at peace
>
> Development--To promote economic recovery within a framework of sound growth and equitable development.
>
> Defense--To provide a security shield against those who use violence against democratization, development and diplomacy.

From a military perspective, General John R. Galvin (1986, p. 10) former SOUTHCOM commander, explairs that democracy is the primary goal. The United States seeks democratic pluralism and has made its relations with the

nations of the region contingent upon it. There is a recognition that the life of the people of the region must be improved by "economic, social and political" growth in order to alleviate fundamental contradictions. The United States stands ready to discuss differences and options with "anyone seeking nonviolent solutions to internal and external problems" and will encourage and support dialogue by others. And finally, the United States will support the self-defense of democratic governments in providing a "security shield" against outside interference and intervention. "Our nation believes," Galvin (1986) states," that [to] the degree these objectives are accomplished, United States interests will be served because stability will return and the ideas of democracy will triumph" (p. 10).

The general rationale for the "Four D's" appears to be sound and has enjoyed moderately broad support. Consensus quickly fades, however, when discussion focuses on specific actions and policies promulgated in support of these broad policy objectives. For instance, there has been widespread criticism within the United States of an over-emphasis in United States policy on the "fourth D"--Defense, with some advocating instead a new "D"--"De-militarization"--for the area (Child in Fauriol,

1985, p. 155).

The "Four D's"--Problems and Potentials

The "Four D" paradigm can serve as a general framework to examine past United States policy in Latin America and to gain perspective on implications for its future. The following, then, is intended to be, not an explanation or critique of each facet of the present policy but rather an examination of relevant factors by which the present policy may be understood and improved.

Democracy

Though democracy is the guiding tenet of current U.S. policy in Latin America, such has not always been the case. Justified by a perceived necessity for stability in the region, over the decades the United States has lent its support to various Latin American dictators. Schoultz (1987, p. 320) notes that "...for the sake of stability Washington has at times become allied with repugnant dictatorships, authoritarian systems directed by men like Batista, Pinochet, Somoza, Strossner, and Trujillo." The United States, he says, was well aware of the dictatorial nature of the regimes it supported but deemed regional stability more important than open political systems.

Schoultz (1987) observes

> Not being fools, our allies in Latin America quickly realized their key role in Washington's perceptions of the balance of power. All these allies needed to do to obtain aid from the United States was to pursue an anti-communist foreign policy and to maintain domestic political stability. Too often this stability was achieved by stifling domestic political dissent with weapons provided by the United States, provided on the understanding that they would be used to fight Communist adventurism. (p. 304)

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, he says, once remarked that Somoza "may be an SOB, but at least he's OUR SOB" (p. 320). More recently, he notes, former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, has argued that the United States should continue to support Third World dictators in the name of stability to protect itself against Communist expansionism (p. 112).

Schoultz (1987) notes that "U.S. officials gave too little weight to the short term benefits of identifying U.S. interests with an existing government" (pp. 300-302). Since the Sandinista Revolution, however, the United States has increasingly attempted to distance itself from repressive, dictatorial governments, albeit in a selective manner. Withdrawal of United States support from Duvallier in Haiti, Marcos in the Philippines, and Noriega in Panama are dramatic recent examples of this policy trend. The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (1984) argues that

> Experience has destroyed the argument of the old dictators that a strong hand is essential to avoid anarchy and communism, and that order and progress can be achieved only through authoritarianism...order is more often threatened when people have no voice in their own destinies. (pp. 11-12)

Schoultz (1987) concurrs, noting that

> Recent history demonstrates that U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes cannot maintain stability forever: they invariably collapse, and when they fall they tend to be replaced by new regimes whose leaders are not inclined to forgive and forget the years of U.S. support for tyranny...the real trade off occurs when short sighted officials support authoritarian stability today and ignore the growing evidence that this support leads to threatening instability in the future. The lessons of Iran, Cuba, and now Nicaragua are clear: the chickens always come home to roost. (p. 322)

The professed goals of contemporary revolutionary movements differ from those of the past. Lieutenant General Richard D. Lawrence, former president of the National Defense University, (Fauriol, 1985, p. vii) notes "Whereas previous struggles were contests to decide who would govern, recent insurgencies are more ideological, seeking to change the form of government."

By supporting repressive, dictatorial regimes in the past, the United States has often put itself in the position of being identified with those who are opposed to the basic rights for which the guerrillas profess to be fighting. Doherty (1986) states

> ...we can no longer simply support administrations... throughout the world simply because they're anti-communist. They've got to be more. They've got to

> join us in the struggle for freedom and democracy and pluralism, because that's the place that you're going to beat the communists.

Though U.S. support for such regimes has declined (and others have been replaced by emerging democracies), ruling oligarchies often remain in place and are perceived by the less priviledged as being equally repressive. Many campesinos and urban poor remain outside the democratic process and constitute fertile ground for Communist recruiting efforts. Berryman (1987) notes that

> the right to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' is meaningless to those who live at an inhumane level because they cannot find work and have no land on which to raise food. Freedom of the press is relative in a country where 80 percent of the population cannot afford to buy a newspaper. (p. 122)

Palmer (Fauriol, 1987) explains that "at the micro level, a sense of relative deprivation, reinforced by declining system responsiveness, made the peasant population susceptible to radical appeals" (p. 89). The Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project (1986) notes that "continued repression alienates the population, driving political activity underground and enabling insurgents to countermobilize broad elements of the population in opposition to the regime" (p. 11-5). To the extent that Latin American political systems, whether democratic or dictatorial, remain unresponsive to the needs of the people, radical elements will continue to exploit the opportunity.

True participatory democracy may take a different form in Latin America than has developed within the United States but, regardless of form, the needs of the people must be addressed. It is towards this end that "Democracy" is one of the "Four D's" of United States policy in Latin America.

Dialogue

The ability and willingness to discuss differences with those of opposing views is essential to any long term foreign policy. The lack of dialogue in the past has contributed to the radicalization of both campesinos and governments. Even within a single government, such as the United States, the lack of internal dialogue and coordination often has led to fragmented and ineffective policies.

Inter-Agency Coordination. Maechling, former staff director of the National Security Council Special Group on Counterinsurgency under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson (Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project, 1986) explains the effect of a lack of internal dialogue and overall strategic coordination on 1960's era counterinsurgency policy. He states

> Each of the national security departments...reacted in typical agency fashion to third world revolutionary movements...(The State Department) looked to "quick fix" military and economic aid programs as a means of

> propping up "friendly" regimes. The Central Intelligence Agency focused on external sources of domestic subversion and tended to view left wing dissent in terms of conspiracy and Marxist penetration. The Pentagon approached revolutionary movements in terms of their military impact and favored broad brush modernization of local military forces and conversion of their missions from external defense to internal security--no questions asked about the political consequences. (pp. 11-12)

Today, almost thirty years later, approximately the same description of United States foreign policy implementation in Latin America could be made. Many question if any lessons have been learned.

Budahn (1987) reports the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Joint Low Intensity Conflict report as noting that "A historical survey of United States reactions to low intensity conflict is replete with permutations of departmental rivaleries and suspicions...the battle for budgets and the [differing] military views of whatever are the appropriate missions."

The need for coordination in approaching low intensity conflicts in Latin America is evident. The Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project (1986) notes that "LIC [Low Intensity Conflict] requires a multidisciplinary, cross-functional, joint, interagency, and combined effort to achieve success" (p. 16-5). Military operations in a low intensity conflict are but one aspect of the struggle and must be pursued in close coordination with and in support of

political, economic and social objectives (Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 1987, p. 10; Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project, 1986, p. 16-2). In Low Intensity Conflict, the military component must extend beyond tactics and encompass a strategic concept of what is to be accomplished. Kuster (1987) notes that

> An astute military planner will think strategically of coordinated programs extending the host nation's responsiveness to the people; programs recognizing the basic infrastructure and emphasizing their strengths to enhance the popular perception of government legitimacy. (p. 29)

Thus, a challenge to be faced and surmounted in future low intensity conflicts is the matter of implementing a strategically-coordinated counterinsurgency program addressing the true causes of insurgency.

Military-to-Military Coordination. Key to implementing such programs is maintaining a dialogue and coordination with the host government military forces. Assuming the moral legitimacy of such forces and of the government they represent, United States military-to-military coordination seeks to encourage the host country military to work towards mutual goals, to emphasize the subordination of the military to civilian control and to enhance military professionalism (Galvin, 1986, pp. 10-11).

In terms of civic action, it is essential that United

States military forces work in conjunction with those of the host government for it is the host government that is ultimately responsible to the people. The Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project (1986) explains that

> We must be sensitive to the dangers of bypassing the indigenous government to directly affect changes in the society. Such action, rather than enhancing the legitimacy of the regime, could create a popular perception of the government as being ineffective and a lackey of a foreign power. (p. 11-8)

Thus, it is critical that United States military forces assist those of the host government in an unobstrusive manner in order to enhance the host nation's efforts and credibility (Center for Low Intensity Conflict. 1987, p. 11).

Fulghum (1987) quotes Colonel Frederick C. Bosse. commander of the Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley Air Force Base, as stating

> A major factor in Blazing Trails [Army engineering training exercise in Central America] is the...host country. You don't want the civilian populace to say "It's the Americans that are building this road." It's (the Honduran military) that is doing it and we are assisting them in the process. (p. 30)

Military-to-military contacts extend beyond the civic action arena. General Galvin (1986) notes that interaction between United States and Latin American militaries include security assistance, combined exercises, mobile training teams, personnel exchange programs, small unit exchanges,

conferences, workshops and visits all of which "provide opportunities for assisting host nation's military institutions (to) participate in democratic development and contribute to national security" (p. 14).

Military-Peace Corps Coordination. One area that has received very little attention is the potential increased coordination between United States military forces engaged in nation-building projects in a host country and United States Peace Corps Volunteers (PCV) working on similar nation-building programs. Although they too work for the United States government, there appears to be considerable skepticism on the part of at least some PCV's to be associated with the United States military. Swenarski (1987, p. 16), a Peace Corps Volunteer writing of her experiences in Honduras, notes that there are many differences between PCV's and American soldiers. The soldiers arrive in Honduras with little or no language or cultural training; the PCV has at least twelve weeks of intensive training. The soldier remains in the country for usually six months while the PCV stays two years. The PCV, she writes, "sees himself as someone trying to help the poor people of the particular country while he sees American soldiers as an intrusion lacking respect and good intensions" (p. 16). Peace Corps volunteers and soldiers

avoid each other. She states "American soldiers...are associated with war, brothels, veneral disease and AIDS. Peace Corps volunteers, on the other hand, are associated with charity, sacrifice and pacificism" (p. 16).

General Galvin, Binder (1987, p. 38) notes, encouraged local cooperation with other United States government agencies including the Peace Corps. He relates an instance where U.S. military engineers, returning from a well drilling operation in a remote Honduran site, encountered a Peace Corps Volunteer working in the area. General Galvin cites the incident as a lost opportunity because had the engineers known the PCV was in the area they could have coordinated their work with his and thus strengthened the Peace Corps. Unfortunately, the general laments, PCV's often attempt to avoid contact with the U.S. military or to seek their help.

The "natural" suspicion of Peace Corps Volunteers towards the U.S. military and the military's lack of effective advance coordination with the in-country Peace Corps Volunteers results in many such lost opportunities. Swenarski (1987) notes

> America has the power to make a lot of positive changes in the lives of these people, and a first step toward improving our efforts to do that is a better understanding between American military and American civilians overseas. (p. 20)

Military-Clergy Cooperation. Another area of potentially useful cooperation exists between United States military forces and local clergy and religious workers in the host country. Hundreds of North American missionaries are at work throughout Latin America seeking to improve the living conditions of the campesinos and others in the area.

Unfortunately, the suspicion of the military expressed by Peace Corps Volunteers is small compared to that held by many clergy and religious workers. In many areas, there has been an almost complete alienation between the clergy and the military as a result of past repression by various governments. One missionary priest comments "if you approach the local church dressed in Battle Dress Uniforms, you've already lost your credibility" (McEwen and Reddell, 1986, pp. 65-66).

Nevertheless, in terms of civic action projects and nation-building programs aimed at improving the lot of the poor, the military and the clergy share many common goals. The extent to which such goals can be unified in a coordinated effort remains to be seen. In this task, the onus appears to be on the military.

Public Dialogue. In the battle for the "hearts and minds" of the people, the role of public information becomes crucial. On the positive side, the Joint Low Intensity

Conflict Project report (1986) notes that "Effective developmental programs and popular reforms will have limited effect in building popular support if the people are not told about them" (p. 15-3). On the other hand, Ratliff (in Fauriol, 1985, p. 178) cautions that the insurgents are becoming increasingly skilled in manipulating the media and public opinion to their own ends. Hoehn and Weiss (in Fauriol, 1985, p. 20) explain how the Salvadoran guerrillas exploited the mass media, publicizing acts of violence by government and quasi-government forces to create the illusion that their own violent acts were purely defensive. Thus, within a country faced with insurgency, public information plays a key role.

Outside the country, public information plays an equally vital role. The support of the American electorate for United States policies and actions in Latin America is largely a function of their level of knowledge about the area. Unfortunately, that knowledge has been sparse at best. Arnold (1987) states "...despite sensational news reporting, the U.S. public remains generally ignorant of the historic, economic and cultural backgrounds of Central American countries" (p. 31). LaFeber (1984) notes "No region in the world is in greater political and economic turmoil than Central America and there are few areas about

which North Americans are more ignorant" (p. 8).

Ratliff (in Fauriol, 1985) states

> The critical problems in United States policy toward Latin America have long been indifference and ignorance, problems that pervaded government, academe, the media and the population as a whole. As a result, constructive response to problems in Latin America, from insurgency to economic development and political freedom, must begin with interest. (p. 187)

On the national policy level, former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger (Bond, 1986) expressed the criticality of public dialogue stating

> our military can help with the contemporary equivalent of the use of plows and muskets. But that help must be designed into a strategy which involves diplomacy and economic leverage and the proper management of our technological riches, and the proper, unashamed and unrelenting willingness to make our case at the bar of public opinion abroad and at home. Absent such a strategy, the use of military assest alone will be feckless, wasteful, and unfair... (p. 88).

Development

A key element of United States policy in Latin America on both strategic and tactical levels is national development or nation-building. In this context, development is "the process by which a government improves the quality of life for its people and strengthens its links to the population in order to gain support" (Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project, 1986, p. 11-1).

Development and Insurgency. Development can be a major factor both in preventing an insurgency and in

responding to one already in progress. The Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project (1986) explains that

> Development, if properly managed, offers hope for stabilizing the regime. Over the long term, political and economic development can strengthen existing political institutions, create new institutions capable of accomodating demands for expanded participation, and provide upward socio-economic mobility. It can satisfy aspirations and assimilate potentially radical elements of society into the work force. (p. 11-3)

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) notes the importance of providing development assistance directly to a nation's poor. The agency (USAID, 1987, p. 4) notes that capital-intensive projects such as dams, railroads, highways and steel mills do not always produce wealth that "trickles down" to the poorest segments of a society. The agency's "New Directions" in development strategy focuses on basic human needs. The strategy (USAID, 1987) means

> ...increasing the access of the poor to such productive resources as land, fertilizer, seeds, tools and credit...increasing investment and production in those activities that employ unskilled labor...expanding health, nutrition and family planning services and education and (improving) over time the productive capacity and employment potential of the poor. (p. 5)

USAID's focus on the poor is in line with the recommendations made by the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (1984), the Kissinger Commission.

Kissinger Commission Recommendations. From the viewpoint of the United States, the strategic goal of

development is to secure the support of the population through improvements in the social condition. The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (1984) noting that "No investment in Central America will be more productive over the long run than that made to improve the health, education, and social welfare of its people" (p. 52), recommended the following "ambitious yet realistic objectives for the 1980's" (p. 68):

--The reduction of malnutrition
--The elimination of illiteracy
--Universal access to primary education
--Universal access to primary health care
--A significant reduction in infant mortality
--A sustained reduction in population growth rates
--A significant improvement in housing

The Commission (pp. 77-78) called for improved health care delivery systems, village-level water systems, eradication of victor-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue fever, provision of effective insecticides, improvement of drainage and sewage disposal systems, and programs of oral rehydration and immunization to fight debilitating childhood diseases such as diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, measles and polio.

The Commission also recommended

> Integrated programs of rural development targeted at the food producing sector [as having] enormous potential for improving the welfare of large numbers of people, while increasing and diversifying agricultural production and dependence on food imports. (pp. 57-58)

Projects specifically noted as being needed included expansion of feeder roads, storage facilities and rural electrification along with an increase in rural research and extension services to develop crops for the domestic markets. In addition, the Commission (p. 72) recommended the expansion of the International Executive Corps, a private voluntary organization of retired business executives, and a concentration of their activities on training managers of small businesses in Central America.

The Kissinger Commission's recommendations for development have military relevance. Military civic action projects, focused on the Kissinger Commission recommendations and done in coordination with the development efforts of other United States government agencies, can contribute to the overall strategic solution of the Central American crisis by addressing the social and economic ills of the people.

Development and Instability. An inherent danger in broad-ranging development projects is that the very fact of raising the standard of living of the poor may in itself be a cause of instability within the host nation. Addressing the effect of change agents on traditional societies, Schoultz (1987) notes that

> ...the Peace Corps is often cited as "subversive" of the fatalistic acceptance of poverty in Latin America. The

> picture being perceived in Washington is of bright, enegertic, and reasonably well-scrubbed U.S. volunteers entering remote Latin American villages, gaining the confidence of the improvished population, and eventually succeeding in the twin struggles against an uncaring government and centuries of ingrained passivity. Success may be slow in coming, but in the end the effect of these intrusive Americans is to impregnate Latin America with a new consciousness of poverty. A similar role is being played by the U.S. aid program. U.S. aid funds build schools, health clinics and roads, and these open new vistas for Latin America's poor. Meanwhile, prodding AID development specialists force reluctant Latin American bureaucrats to expand the role of government in addressing the problems of poverty. In both cases, the U.S. aid program destabilizes traditional structures. (pp. 85-86)

Thus, development can be both a means of combating a destabilizing insurgency and a destabilizing force in and of itself.

In some cases, carelessly conceived development projects have backfired. Dominguez (1980, p. 126 in LaFeber, 1984, p. 203) notes that under the Alliance for Progress military civic action actually did little for economic balance and democracy. In many cases civilian jobs were turned over to government troops even as unemployment was rampant in the country. LaFeber (1984, p. 184) states that the Alliance "raised hopes but did little or nothing for peasants or laborers" who, in many cases, were displaced by machines and forced to live as squatters or migrate to the cities.

LaFeber (1984, p. 184) further explains that in

Honduras the Alliance for Progress attempted to help the country but failed to diversify the economy. The resultant expansion of the export sector led to the appropriation of campesino lands by the oligarchy and the setting in motion of a class struggle. Dominquez (1980, p. 126 in LaFeber, 1984, p. 203) warns that in participating in such development projects the United States runs the risk of being identified at the grass roots level with the promulgation of unjust policies. "Rapid economic development," the Center for Low Intensity Conflict (1986) states, "can satisify rising aspirations BUT...it is not a panacea. [It] may contribute to instability by alienating the rural poor, and retrenchment can exacerbate dissatisfaction" (p. 11-5).

The effects of development strategies upon the internal political structure of a country must also be considered. The Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project (1986 citing Huntington, 1968) notes that "Modernization produces change. It ultimately can result in instability by disrupting traditional social groups and relationships" (p. 11-1). As peasants gain consciousness and political power, pressures increase for basic changes in the structures of society, structures which often serve to enrich relatively small groups of people. Various interest groups of the

entrenched oligarchy commonly oppose basic reform measures. Depending on the relative inequality, injustice and repressiveness of the status quo establishment, such changes, if effected, would themselves be revolutionary and could jeapordize the privileged positions of the country's political and economic elite. The governmental challenge is to balance the interests and desires of the various groups--an often delicate and difficult task. The Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project (1986) explains "The regime may have to walk a narrow path between revolution and coup d'etat since the political and economic reforms that undercut popular support for the insurgent may undercut the political base of the regime as well" (p. 11-2).

Development, then, can be a two-edged sword which, in the very process of addressing the grievences of a nation's poor, can actually produce destabilizing results that are the antithesis of its intention. The need for careful planning and United States interagency systemic coordination of nation-building projects is absolutely essential in order to prevent eventual socio-economic and political chaos from engulfing the process.

Defense

Avoidance of the Use of U.S. Combat Forces. One goal

of United States policy in Latin America is to avoid the direct involvement of U.S. combat forces in counter-insurgency operations and to attempt to restrict such conflicts to the lowest possible level of violence (Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 1987, p. 12). As a legacy of the Vietnam War, there is a deep-seated reluctance to commit United States forces to combat unless there is clear and relatively unrestrained support for such action from the American people (LaFeber, 1984, p. 306; Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project, 1986, pp. 3-4).

The Center for Low Intensity Conflict (1987) states "United States forces should be used only where and when they have a high probability of decisively altering the overall situation" (p. 3). One such recent use was the action on Grenada. The operation involved the application of massive U.S. combat power against a limited target for limited, well-defined aims which could be accomplished quickly with relatively little risk.

Long-Term Perspective. Insurgencies, however, are not quickly fought to successful conclusions. Challis (1987) notes that the British were able to prevail against the Malay insurgents, 1948-1960, because they settled in for the long haul. "This contrasts sharply," he says, "with the American penchant for large-scale, fast-tempo operations

designed to yield rapid results before the American public and Congress lose patience" (p. 69). Many question whether the United States has the capacity to emulate the British in Malaysia and take the long-term perspective necessary to defeat insurgencies. Peters (1986) notes "As a military power, the United States has everything but patience. The American people will support almost any military action as long as it swiftly produces demonstrable victory" (p. 2).

Combatting insurgencies in Central America and the Caribbean Basin requires more than a short term commitment of interest and resources. Johnson and Russell (1986) argue that

> To be successful, the U.S. Army must develop short, intermediate and long-range strategies. The short and intermediate range U.S. strategies are to reduce the Soviet-Cuban influence and to promote stability in Central America. The long-range strategy is to assist in eliminating the "causes" of insurgency. (p. 72)

The extent to which the United States is successful in alleviating the "causes" of insurgency will determine the long term success of its policies in the region.

Future Directions

The direction U.S. policy will take in the region in the future can be only a speculative guess. U.S. domestic politics as well as regional and global events will dictate its course. However, any future policy must deal with the

reality of revolution in the region--be it peaceful, socio-economic revolution or revolution of the violent, political variety. Given the rampant poverty and socio-economic injustices in the area, lack of the former will make the latter all but inevitable. Morgenthau (LaFeber, 1984) argues "The real issue facing American foreign policy is not how to preserve stability in the face of revolution, but how to create stability out of revolution" (p. 16).

The inevitable Latin American revolution is now upon us. But, were it not for the alliance of convenience between indigeneous revolutionaries and Communist opportunists, such a revolution would be of no threat to the United States. The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (1984) argues

> ...indigeneous reform, even indigeneous revolution, is not a security threat to the United States. But the intrusion of aggressive outside powers exploiting local grievances to expand their own political influence and military control is a serious threat to the United States and to the entire hemisphere. (p. 4)

The Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy (Burlage, 1987) (including in its 13 members Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State; W. Grahm Clayton, Jr., former Secretary of the Navy; William P. Clark, former national security advisor; General [retired] John W. Vessey, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General

(retired) Andrew J. Goodpaster, former Commander-in-Chief, Europe) notes that "Soviet power has bypassed the lines we drew [in Europe] and has pushed into Southern Asia, the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean and Central America" (p. 53). The Commission calls for a dramatic shift in U.S. strategy to emphasize conflicts in the Third World.

The Soviet Union and its surrogate, Cuba, indeed are exploiting the situation in Central America to their own nefarious ends. For the United States, there are moral as well as strategic dimensions to the conflict. Addressing both, the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (1984) states

> When strategic interests conflict with moral interests, the clash presents one with the classic challenges to confront societies and statesmen. But in Central America today, our strategic and moral interests coincide...they include:
>
> --To preserve the moral authority of the United States. To be perceived by others as a nation that does what is right <u>because</u> it is right is one of this country's principal assets.
>
> --To improve the living conditions of the people of Central America. They are neighbors. Their human need is tinder [for Communist revolution] waiting to be ignited. And if it is, the conflagration could threaten the entire hemisphere.
>
> --To advance the cause of democracy, broadly defined, within the hemisphere
>
> --To strengthen the hemispheric system by strengthening what is now, in both economic and social terms, one of the weakest links

> --To promote peaceful change in Central America while resisting the violation of democracy by force and terrorism
>
> --To prevent hostile forces from seizing and expanding control in a strategically vital area of the Western hemisphere
>
> --To bar the Soviet Union from consolidating either directly or through Cuba a hostile foothold on the American continents in order to advance its strategic purposes (pp. 37-38)

Whether the Commission's recommendations will become platitudes of the past or building blocks of the future is to be determined. The challenge posed to the United States is how to implement the Commission's recommendations while preserving both the nation's strategic interests and its moral integrity. In so doing, the United States must have a strategic vision that transcends merely "containing Communism." It must recognize the need to ally itself with the revolutionary changes that are sweeping Latin America by assisting wherever possible in the improvement of the quality of life of the common people of the region. The task is imperative; the implementation, difficult. But out of adversity often arises determination and innovation. The nation has confronted and overcome challenges before and has the capacity to do so again. Schoultz (1987) argues

> As a nation we pride ourselves on our innovation, our creativity, our progress. We like to spend our time solving problems, meeting challenges, moving ahead. As it is practiced in our policy towards Latin America, containment is not well-suited to our temperment. It

chaffs our nature.

> Many policy makers, and, I think, particularly our brightest policy makers, do not want their tombstones to read, "He spent his life stopping Communism in Latin America." They want it instead to read, "She spent her life creating a better hemisphere." (p. 329)

In the product of this creation lies our collective future.

Chapter 5

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: ONCE AND FUTURE WAR

"What would you do if you were I?" MacWhite asked.

"I'd go to Vietnam and take a look at the fighting around Dien Bien Phu." Magsaysay said without hesitating. "I know you're a diplomat and that warfare is not supposed to be your game; but you'll discover soon enough out here that statesmanship, diplomacy, economics and warfare just can't be separated from one another. And if you keep your eyes and ears open, you'll start to see some of the connections between them. It's not something you can learn from textbooks. It's the feel for the thing."

Lederer and Burdick
The Ugly American. 1958

Chapter 5

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: ONCE AND FUTURE WARFARE

The Spanish word for "war" is "guerra." Its diminutive form, "guerrilla," means "little war." The term arose during the Spanish resistance to French imperialism in the early 19th century although the concept and pursuit of "little wars" by partisan troops against numerically superior forces predates Christianity and finds its roots among the ancient Egyptians and Chinese (Fauriol, 1985, pp. 1-2). It is a kind of warfare employed by the weak against the strong, trying to gradually weaken the opponent and ultimately gain political victory (Hoehn and Weiss in Fauriol, 1985, p. 9). Today, "guerrilla war" is the dominate form of conflict encountered in the Americas and is the focus of United States Low Intensity Conflict doctrine.

Calling for a different approach to a different (for the United States) kind of war, President Kennedy (Kuster, 1987) described guerrilla war as follows

> This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins--war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called "wars of liberation," to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally

achieved...(p. 25)

Under the Kennedy administration, the Special Forces were born, counterinsurgency doctrine was formulated, pacification programs were initiated. Following the debacle of Vietnam, however, the nation and the U.S. Army turned its attention to conventional war in Europe. It wanted "no more shadow wars in the jungle--the Army was back on the real battlefield" (Kuster, 1987, p. 21).

Increasingly, however, it has become obvious that the "real battlefield" lies as much in the mountains of Central America or on the islands of the Caribbean as in the hills of Europe. The U.S. military establishment has had to confront again the challenge of the "little war," now referred to as Low Intensity Conflict.

Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Center for Low Intensity Conflict, June 1987) define Low Intensity Conflict as

> ...a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic and psycho-social pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low Intensity Conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics and level of violence. (p. 1)

Within the United States Department of Defense there is considerable debate as to nature of Low Intensity

Conflict and the appropriate national response. It is a concept still in development even as it is being fought.

TRADOC PAM 525-44, U.S. Army Operational Concept for Low Intensity Conflict (1985), divides Low Intensity Conflict into four broad areas: 1) Peacekeeping Operations, 2) Peacetime Contingency Operations, 3) Terrorism Counteraction, and 4) Foreign Internal Defense (Zais, 1986, p. 90). In the context of Latin America, it is the latter that receives emphasis.

Foreign Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) is "those actions taken by civilian and military agencies of one government in any program taken by another government to preclude or defeat insurgency" (TRADOC PAM 525-44). Zais (1986, p. 93) states that IDAD is simply a new name for an old concept--counterinsurgency--but, he concedes, the definition does acknowledge the inclusion of economic and political activities as well as military. Planners at the United States Southern Command in Panama (USSOUTHCOM, 1986) argue that Low Intensity Conflict is "total war" stating

> While the military means used in low intensity conflict are limited, the political end--the complete overthrow of the established government--is not. In this sense, Low Intensity Conflict is total war conducted with certain military constraints. (p. 1)

Bond (1986, p. 81) observes that under IDAD, programs can be both "proactive," to try to prevent an insurgency

from developing. and "reactive."imolemented after insurgency has broken out.

Phases of Insurgency

The target of IDAD efforts is the avoidance or suppression of insurgency. The U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict (p. 31), identifies three general stages of an insurgency: 1) Latent and Incipient Insurgency, 2) Guerrilla Warfare and 3) War of Movement. Johnson and Russell (1986, p. 71) further divide the progress of an insurgency into seven general phases as follows:

1) Latent/Clandestine Phase
2) Violent Propaganda Phase
3) Organizational Growth Phase
4) Guerrilla Offensive Phase
5) Mobilization of the Masses Phase
6) Final Assult Phase
7) Consolidation Phase

Regardless of artificial divisions. it is essential to understand that insurgency does not spring full blown upon an unsuspecting country. It is a develoomental process with each phase requiring different tactics to counter its progress (see Appendix A: Counter-Insurgency Strategies).

FM 100-20 describes insurgent acivities in each phase. During Phase One. Latent and Incipient Insurgency, the insurgents attempt to develop their infrastructure and

organization, recruit members, establish a chain of command, decide on an ideology, plan the campaign, initiate psychological operations to exploit the grievances of the people, build and train the armed elements and conduct limited terrorist activity aimed at securing weapons and demonstrating the government's inability to maintain law and order.

In Phase Two, Guerrilla Warfare, the insurgents move to control growing areas of the country and to tie down government forces in fixed, defensive positions; they attempt to provoke repressive acts by the government in order to further alienate the government from the populace; and they increase their attacks on government forces through ambushes and attacks on lines of supply and communication.

In Phase Three, War of Movement, the insurgents utilize large units in direct assult on government forces, such as the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam.

It is obvious that an insurgency is vastly different from the European conventional war scenario. The goals of the protagonists as well as their tactics are unique to the situation. The pivotal difference, however, is the importance of winning the support of the population. Brown (1987) notes that

> Combating an insurgency is not the same as fighting a war. In an insurgency, the military dimension is not

> likely to be decisive: more important are the economic, political and psychological dimensions of the conflict. The principle task in an insurgency is not to destroy the enemy's forces in battle but to win the support of the populace. (p. 49)

The Socio-Political Environment

The main battle area, the area where victory or defeat will occur, is the sociopolitical environment (Johnson and Russell, 1986, p. 71). The support of the population is essential. McEwen and Reddell (1986, p. 62) argue that "when the government in power is successful in winning the support of the people, insurgencies cannot expand because there will be no base of support" (p. 62). Without the support of the population, insurgents lose their source of supplies, their recruits, their intelligence networks, and their legitimacy. General John R. Galvin (Binder, 1987, p. 26), former SOUTHCOM commander, explains that guerrillas must exist among the people, without whose support they cannot survive. Ratliff (in Fauriol, 1985) states "...as the ancient Chinese Sun Tzu observed, a guerrilla without support among the people is like a fish without water" (p. 190). Conversely, without the support of the people, the government too loses its legitimacy and must contend with ever-widening waves of popular discord.

The perceived legitimacy of the government by the

populace is critical to victory over an insurgency. Often, governmental reform is necessary to establish or maintain moral legitimacy. SOUTHCOM's Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD)(Fulghum, Four Ingredients, 1987) states

> Battlefield victories over guerrillas must be accompanied by practical reforms and tolerance by the government to retain moral legitimacy. If a government allows repressive officials or policies to slip back into government and fails to continue building democracy, it will lose legitimacy with the people and the insurgency will be rekindled. (p. 42)

Kuster (1987) maintains that "popular support is the bedrock of insurgency" (p. 23). The veracity of such a view is acknowledged by General Rios Montt (Sereseres in Fauriol, 1985), former president of Guatemala, who advocates a national security policy specifically designed to win the support of the people. He writes

> If we close our eyes, increase the number of soldiers and policemen, and we attack the subversives, we can do it (defeat the guerrillas). And in three months the guerrilla will return....Security does not consist of arms, tanks and airplanes. This is not even five percent of the requirement for a national secuirity policy. Security lies in the sense of trust between the state and the people...(p. 109)

Popular support, however, cannot be won by merely raising the flag and issuing proclamations. Krulak (1986) states that "...when the peasant is certain that he is not just exchanging one set of hollow promises for another--then the balance of intelligence and the tide of the battle will shift to the forces we support" (p. 106). Kuster (1987)

warns that

> ...in the eyes of the population, the actual yardstick for legitimacy is the perception of effectiveness and whether the government has a genuine concern for public welfare...Haphazard programs and hollow promises serve only to intensify the perception that insurgent claims of governmental ineptitude or callousness are accurate. (p. 26)

It is the goal of the insurgents to delegitimatize the government in the eyes of the people. The government's response should be to effectively address the grievances of the people, thereby denying the guerrillas the support of the populace. Despite the bitter experience of Vietnam, the "main battle area" in an insurgency remains the "hearts and minds" of the people.

Civic Action

From the military standpoint, a key element in gaining the support of the population in defeating an insurgency is civic action. Ball (1981) explains that civic action attempts to build up a country's infrastructure, facilitate the development process and "demonstrate to the disaffected population that the government (is) concerned about their situation" (p. 26). Baines (1972, cited in LaFeber, 1984, p. 152) argues that civic action is "the most effective means of combatting...the expansionist plans of Communism" and that such operations give the military the

"affection and respect of the people" (pp. 474-475).

The importance of securing the allegiance of the people has not been lost on Communists. In his 1934 work, "Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses", Mao Tse-Tung (1966) writes "we should help the masses realize that we represent their interests, that our lives are intimately bound up in theirs" (p. 153). In his 1938 treatise, "On Protracted War," he applies this concept directly to military actions writing "the Army must become one with the people so that they will see it as their own Army. Such an Army will be invincible" (p. 153).

McEwen and Reddell (1986) echo Mao's central thesis noting that "when a country's soldiers are more known for their work with band-aids and bulldozers than with bullets and bombs, then the [people] will see them as representatives of a government that truly cares for its people" (p. 68).

Military Civic Action Forces

Caring for the people, however, requires special kinds of military forces. Peters (1986) notes that "Low Intensity Conflict is a sorry job for general purpose forces unless a state opts for the approach that delivers overwhelming combat power in a swift and violent manner

[such as in the deployment of United States forces to the Dominican Republic and Grenada]" (pp. 21-22). Zais (1986, pp. 97-98) points out that, in assisting local governments in combating insurgency, military forces must be tailored to the situation. One type of force, he says, eg. the light infantry division, cannot perform all the missions required in a Low Intensity Conflict environment. "Light infantry forces," he states, "generally are not trained, organized or psychologically oriented to win hearts and minds or conduct nation-building--tasks which are critical in the early stages of insurgency" (p. 98).

Zais (1986, pp. 97-98) argues that the sequencing of forces to fight an insurgency is "exactly opposite to that used in a large-scale strike operation...combat support [CS] and combat servive support [CSS] forces are introduced first" with combat forces used last and as a last resort (see Appendix B: Mission-Force Match). In the early stages of insurgency, when the main effort is "nation-building", CS/CSS forces play the primary, not the support, role. "In a reversal of the 'normal' role where CS and CSS units follow combat troops, in FID [Foreign Internal Defense]," Bond (1986) states, "CS and CSS forces are usually the first in and the last out" (p. 82).

Zais (1986) states that, during the early stages of

insurgency, conventional combat troops are ineffective. The counterinsurgency goal, he states, should be not the destruction of the insurgent forces but "the improvement of the conditions of life for the populace and the removal of the causes of insurgency" (p. 94). United States military assistance during this stage should be limited to combat support and combat service support forces such as engineers to dig wells and build roads, hospitals, dams and schools; medical units for health care and sanitation projects; military police to provide security, law and order (more effective than combat troops in that military police are trained to de-escalate violence); civil affairs units to coordinate with local governments; and psychological operations units to communicate the government message to the people. In each of these tasks, he states, the United States should train the host nation to perform the missions so as to demonstrate the government's concern for the people and the fact that it is in control of the situation.

The appropriate response to the guerrilla warfare stage of insurgency, Zais explains, is the continued use of CS/CSS forces and the addition of Special Forces to train and advise local government military units. The host government should develop and use light infantry units in area denial operations and ambushes to isolate guerrilla

forces from their support bases. The focus of government combat operations should be on the guerrilla, not on terrain. Night operations and small unit tactics should be emphasized.

In the War of Movement phase, only conventional combat forces can defeat the insurgents.

The "Big Picture" and the Need for Systemic Coordination

In "little wars" it is necessary to see the "big picture" and even adopt the strategy of one's opponents where appropriate. Sereseres (in Fauriol, 1985) writes

> perhaps the key to success in counter-insurgency is ...the ability to move beyond a one-dimensional strategy --dominated by military considerations, resources and objectives--to one that parallels the comprehensive political-military-diplomatic strategy of the guerrilla of the 1980s. (p. 122)

Kuster (1986) likens the development of an insurgency to a "cancerous growth that parasitically nourishes itself on the system it is bent on toppling" (p. 24). In the decade to come, the employment of United States forces to assist in combating the cancer of insurgency must be planned as meticulously as a surgical operation and, like surgery itself, must consider the ramifications of any action on the whole system, be it one body or an entire country.

In seeking to combat insurgencies, the United States

must take a systemic approach. Kuster (1987) notes that a country can be seen as consisting of four interrelated systems: political, economic, security and social. He states "When an attempt is made to influence an element to achieve a particular objective, careful planning and prudent coordination must include an understanding of the implication upon other elements" (p. 28). This is especially true of military operations because of their potential impact on the people living in the area of operations (Binder, 1987, p. 40). Decker (1987) states that because "the people are the key to success...military actions must be measured in terms of their impact on the local populace" (p. 61).

Johnson and Russell (1986, pp. 72-73) argue that U.S. Army counterinsurgency strategy must be part of an overall national and military strategy for the entire host country and for each region therein. They call for the fully coordinated efforts of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of State (to include USAID and USIA) and other U.S. agencies. The Center for Low Intensity Conflict (1987) echos the call, stating "A comprehensive strategy incorporating political, economic, social, psychological and military programs and initiatives is paramount" (p. 1). Kuster (1987) concurrs stating "a coordinated strategy of

political, military and social activities must be identified, coordinated in detail and implemented as the indigeneous absorption rate allows. The operative word in 'strategy'" (p. 25).

The need for clear United States national objectives leading to a fully-coordinated counter-insurgency plan for each host country and its various regions involving multiple government and private agencies and groups concentrating on supporting the legitimacy of the government by effectively addressing the grievances of the people and assisting in the development of required economic infrastructure is manifest. Also evident is the need to adopt a systemic approach to insurgency that includes the political, economic, psychosocial and military components of society. Failure to adopt the lessons of the past to the challenges of the present could lead to disaster. Kuster (1987) warns that "as the political, economic and social infrastructures fracture, only the security infrastructure--the venue of the military--stands between the insurgent and total anarchy" (p. 29). The only alternative to a strategic, coordinated policy, writes Brown (1987), is "killing--otherwise known as a strategy of attrition--which will almost invariably lead to failure" (p. 54).

Chapter 6

USE OF MILITARY FORCES IN CIVIC ACTION

"Look, mister. I don't know how often you get out of Saigon and into the countryside, but you better go take a look at things," Atkins answered evenly.

Mr. Josiah Gordon, the representative from the American Embassy, was beginning to redden, but Atkins didn't care. "You want big industry," he went on. "You want big factories. You want big T.V.A.'s scattered all over the countryside. That all takes skilled workmen, and mines, and lots of money, and a whole lot of good people who are production-minded. Of course, you've got good people out there in the boondocks, good hard-working people who are plenty savvy. But they don't want what you want yet. It takes time for that."

Lederer and Burdick
The Ugly American, 1958

Chapter 6

USE OF MILITARY FORCES IN CIVIC ACTION

The use of organized military forces in civic action operations possesses enormous potential. Through civic action, the military unites with and builds support among the civilian population. While the concept is rarely applied within developed countries, among third world nations with scarce resources, such operations have long been recognized as vital. In 1945, Mao Tse-Tung (1966) wrote

> Wherever our comrads go, they must build good relations with the masses, be concerned for them and help them overcome their difficulties. (p. 154)...As the Army and the people exchange labor and help each other in production, the friendship between them is strengthened. (pp. 191-192)...We must unite with the masses; the more we unite with the masses, the better. (p. 154)

Mao's words have become a standard tenet of Marxist-Leninist insurgencies and continue to exert a profound influence on both guerrilla and counter-guerrilla strategies.

Cuba

Since the inception of his revolution, Fidel Castro has applied Mao's concepts in Cuba. In Revolutionary Cuba, the armed forces have been used in various nation-building

roles such as clearing land, building roads, constructing buildings and even cutting sugar cane. The role of Cuba's armed forces in the economic development of the country has been described as being as important as its traditional defense role (Black, Blustein, Edwards, Johnston and McMorris, 1976, pp. 462-263).

The HUK Rebellion

The importance of military civic action also has been acknowledged and successfully used by certain non-communist governments. During the HUK Rebellion in the Philippians in the 1950's, the country's secretary of defense (and later president) Ramon Magsaysay made civic action a mandatory part of all military operations. These included providing medical assistance to peasants and constructing roads, schools and housing. "Magsaysay correctly assumed that the military could never effectively counter the insurgency without demonstrating that it represented a government willing to improve the lot of the common people in the region" (McEwen and Reddell, 1986, p. 67). The strategy was an important factor in defeating the insurgency.

British Victory in Malaysia, 1948-1960

Challis (1987, pp. 56-69) describes the important

role played by civilian-military cooperation in defeating the 1948-1960 communist insurgency in Malaysia. The insurgency, he states, was a classic three-stage Maoist revolution. The insurgents first targeted isolated populations, rural police stations and the rural populace to establish "liberated" areas and obtain a political and economic base for further operations. They next planned to expand the liberated areas and to recruit a large army. The insurgents reasoned, they would attack the major population centers and defeat the British enemy.

The British were able to defeat the Communists because they developed a comprehensive, local-based strategy that included 1) subordinating military action to civilian control using "war executive committees" with both military and civilian membership to review intelligence, develop strategies and assign missions; 2) consolidating all intelligence collection under the Malay Police; 3) minimizing the use of firepower (artillery) using instead food control and small unit ambushes; 4) assigning permanent geographic responsibility to company-sized units; and 5) integrating civic action programs with all military operations. Challis notes "the people clearly saw a contrast between the positive behavior of the government forces and the brutality of the communists" (pp. 68-69).

Latin American Civic Action

President John F. Kennedy acknowledged the importance of military forces in nation-building, declaring in 1961 that "Armies should not only defend their countries but should also help and build them" (Rojas Garrido, 1982, p. 15).

Latin American militaries have engaged in civic action sporadically and with varying success. Though many officers today express the need for such programs and, indeed, can produce national development plans acknowledging the importance of civic action, to date they have met with but limited success. This is due in part to lack of resources, especially during times of active insurgencies (Gallego and Gosnell, 1987).

One notable military civic action effort has been that of Guatemala. Serseres (Fauriol, 1985, pp. 114-121) explains that under the Rios Mott regime civilian and military working groups cooperated in developing the "Plan Nacional de Desarrollo y Seguridad" ("National Plan of Development and Security"). The plan stated that security depends on socio-economic development and outlined requirements to attack the latent dimensions of the insurgency and establish trust between the armed forces and

the rural population. Arising from the plan, the "Victoria '82" operation sought to 1) expand the number of men under arms, deploying them in small units in the zones of combat and improve command and control of tactical operations; 2) expand the civilian defense forces in the highlands and; 3) initiate socio-economic assistance in the contested zones. Serseres (pp. 115-116) notes that the government, seeking a "force multiplier" to defeat the guerrillas, linked local development assistance to the establishment of local civil defense forces ("patrullas de autodefensa civil"). He states

> The Guatemalan armed forces have demonstrated...that the mobilization and arming of local populations to fight against the guerrillas and the concentration of government services on basic human needs in the areas of conflict are essential elements of a successful counter-insurgency strategy. (p. 121)

In Central America, however, such a strategy is obviously not sufficient unto itself. The Guatemalan insurgency, with its tragic human consequences, has continued.

Nevertheless, Ratliff (Fauriol, 1985, p. 178) argues that insurgents themselves acknowledge the potentially detrimental effect on their cause of effective government civic action. In El Salvador, he says, insurgents have sabotaged reformers for fear that their reforms would make revolution unnecessary.

United States Forces in Civic Action

The employment of United States forces in civic action and nation-building projects has had an uneven history. Although United States military units have been and continue to be used in these projects, such employment has been relatively limited since the Vietnam War.

One long term and on-going military civic action effort is that of United States Civic Action Teams (CATs) employed in Micronesia (Moscos, 1987, p. 14). Established by the Navy in 1962, five CATs currently exist: one Air Force CAT on Truk, one Navy CAT each on Yap and Palau and one Army CAT each on Kosrae and Ponape. Each CAT consists of approximately fifteen members engaged in building and renovating schools and dispensaries, constructing roads and seawalls, and building bridges and drainage ditches. Though engineering skills predominate, each CAT also has a medic to watch over the health of the team and provide assistance to the local population. Though limited in scope, the CAT concept has proven effective in providing needed services in a developing land.

In Latin America, most United States military civic action programs come under the purview of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). The general overall mission of SOUTHCOM is to provide a stable southern flank for the

United States (Galvin, 1986, pp. 10-11). Towards this goal the command seeks "coordinated employment of the full range of its military support capabilities to assist regional states in counter-insurgency operations in lieu of direct U.S. combat power" (USSOUTHCOM, 1986, p. 1). Part of the military support capabilities available include those related to civic action and have as a goal "...enhancing regional social and economic stability through alleviation of the root cause of insurgency (poverty, ignorance, neglect, hunger and disease)" (USSOUTHCOM, 1986, p. 1). General John R. Galvin (Zais 1986, citing Meyer, 1985, p. 36) former SOUTHCOM commander, states

> We are not sending fighting soldiers to these countries (such as Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela). We are sending...developers and instructors....The essential problem here isn't military and the answer to the problem isn't military. The answer is...by providing about 4:1 non-military to military aid. (p. 94)

Under SOUTHCOM's auspices, United States regular military forces conduct such civic action projects as Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs) where Army medical personnel have provided medical, dental and veterinary care to indigenous populations. Army engineer units have participated in repairing schools and health clinics and improving sanitary systems in isolated villages. The U.S. Navy's "Project Handclasp" program has distributed

humanitarian materials to local peoples during port visits and the "Peaceful Presence" program has sent Navy medical and dental teams to remote villages (USSOUTHCOM, 1986, pp. 2, 39).

A typical SOUTHCOM civic action operation was a three day, joint Army, Air Force and Panama Defense Force MEDRETE exercise to Llano Nopo and Alto Guaybo, two isolated villages in Chiriqui Province, Panama (USSOUTHCOM, 1986, p. 5-9). Three Blackhawk helicopters transported medical teams to the villages where they set-up field clinics. The exercise provided the medical personnel the opportunity to hone their skills in identifying and treating endemic and tropical diseases. In three days, the medics treated 1,258 medical patients and 80 dental patients. The vets on the team treated the villagers' livestock and the aviators delivered more than 180 tons of building materials. Thus, the MEDRETE exercise completed the dual missions of providing training opportunities for U.S. personnel and of giving very tangible humanitarian/civic assistance to a remote, poverty-stricken village.

Such civic action operations produce concrete results that go a long ways in countering Communist propaganda. Fulgram ("Army Engineers", 1987) reports that prior to a joint U.S.-Costa Rican bridge building project, "...the

communist newspapers said the Americans would give them AIDS and never leave...[now they] are silent and we've heard nothing but praise from the other press" (p. 10). The Puente de Paz ("Bridge of Peace") project opened up a large section of the previously-isolated Pacific coast. At the project's conclusion, the project commander stated "By making life progressively better for the population, the government is preventing discontent from escalating into violence" (p. 10). Such military civic action projects provide concrete, convincing proof to the rural population that the government is concerned about their welfare and is trying to address their needs.

U.S. Reserve Forces in Civic Action in Latin America

United States Reserve Foces are increasingly assisting SOUTHCOM in "securing the southern flank of the United States." National Guard and Reserve units and individuals now routinely deploy to the SOUTHCOM area of operations in a variety of missions (Binder, 1987, p. 34; Hultman, 1986, p. 7; USSOUTHCOM, 1986, p. 41).

The National Guard has been training in Latin America since the early 1970's (NGB, 1987). In 1987, approximately 7,500 Army National Guard and 3,600 Air National Guard personnel trained in SOUTHCOM. In the past, such

deployments have represented approximately twenty to twenty-five percent of total National Guard overseas training during a given year. National Guard personnel have gone to SOUTHCOM under a variety of programs including Overseas Deployment Training (ODT), Key Personnel Upgrade Program (KPUP), Deployments for Training (DFTs) and various Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises. The Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve have conducted similar training in the area.

Examples of specific civic action-related exercises include:

Blazing Trails--an annual series of JCS approved, SOUTHCOM-sponsored engineer roadbuilding exercises; begun in 1984 with the building of a farm-to-market road in the Azuero Province of Panama; Blazing Trails exercises have occurred in Panama, Honduras, and Ecuador;

Costa Abajo '86--an Army National Guard/Army Reserve roadbuilding exercise in northern Panama;

Field Medical Training Site Rotations--rotations of 60 person Army National Guard medical units through Fort Kobbe, Panama to field training sites such as Blazing Trails locations;

Prime Beef--Air National Guard civil engineer unit deployments to Central America;

Fuertes Caminos (Strong Roads)--a three year roadbuilding exercise in mountainous northern Honduras beginning in January 1988; a continuation of Blazing Trails that will open up the Yoro district (Bogino, 1988, p.31)

The major justification for Reserve Forces participation in Latin American exercises has been the training benefit derived by participating Reserve Component units. SOUTHCOM training represents a significant opportunity for Reserve Forces personnel to mobilize, deploy overseas, perform their missions and redeploy back to their home stations all under realistic conditions (Binder, 1987, p. 37). Hultman (1986) notes

> The Reserve Component soldiers get a taste of what it's like to blaze trails through unfriendly triple-canopy jungles, in areas that are drowned with 120 inches of rainfall annually, and where the air is saturated with heat and humidity. Good training--and training of the sort that isn't available in North America. (p. 7)

The remoteness of the training sites emphasizes for the Guardsmen and Reservists the necessity of advanced planning and self-sufficiency. A Louisiana National Guard engineer major (NGB, "On Guard," No. 6, 1985) returning from a Blazing Trails exercise noted

> Back home if we are short of something, we know that it will eventually get there or that at least we will receive a substitute. Out there, we couldn't be sure of that. So we had to survive with what we had and tried to iron out any problems that might crop up.

The reality of actually being deployed in an overseas

situation with a real mission emphasizes the immediate utility of the training received. Harrison (1987) quotes the project commander at Camp Oso Grande ("Big Bear"), Honduras as noting

> The difference between this and summer camp in the states is that this is "hands-on." This is for real. We're not here practicing at something. This is a real road. This is real security. This is real support for the troops. (p. 10)

It is not only the chance to operate in a remote, hostile environment that enhances training but also the freedom to undertake projects that would be impossible in the United States (Dixon, 1987, p. 6). Binder (1987) quotes a SOUTHCOM official as saying "There's not a place in the United States where the National Guard can go and *build a long road* without running afoul of the unions and contractors...[not to mention environmental impact statements]" (p. 37).

An important spin-off of the training benefit derived by Reserve Forces soldiers training in Latin America is the fact that much of the work undertaken is direct humanitarian/civic assistance done in cooperation with the local militaries for the benefit of the indigenous populace. The roads that are built, the bridges constructed, the medical missions performed are all real and of immediate, real benefit to real people. The training, "carried out in an environment in which poverty and disease are as much a

part of life as breathing" (Binder, 1987, p. 34), leaves behind tangible benefits for the local populations (Dixon, 1987, p. 5). As such, the training constitutes a valuable addition to the civic action efforts of SOUTHCOM and the participating countries. Each bridge built, each dental cavity filled and each cow vaccinated is a small step towards winning the "heart and mind" of the rural campesino and, conversely, by addressing the needs of campesino, denying the insurgent a potential recruit. A peasant lady living along the road constructed by the Army National Guard on the Azuero Peninsula in Panama expressed her thanks for the life-changing road saying "I have nothing to give you but our smiles for what you've done for us here...we love you, please come back" (USSOUTHCOM, 1986, p. 31).

In sum, United States Reserve Forces operating in Latin America receive valuable, real-world training in an often hostile, foreign environment under austere conditions emphasizing competence and self-reliance and leaving behind them tangible improvements in the daily life of thousands of rural campesinos, thereby helping win the hearts and minds of the populace and deter insurgent progress. This, says General Galvin (Binder, 1987) is "...a heck of a lot better training than I used to get in the Guard in 1948 when all we could do was to go down to Camp Edwards and put our tent

pegs in the same holes they were in for the past three years in a row" (p. 21).

Chapter 7

UNITED STATES RESERVE FORCES AS A STRATEGIC ASSET FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

But there was one point which Magsaysay made that MacWhite did not have to put in writing, and never forgot.

"The simple fact is, Mr. Ambassador, that average Americans in their natural state, if you will excuse the phrase, are the best ambassadors a country can give," Magsaysay said. "They are not suspicious, they are eager to share their skills. they are generous...get an unaffected American, sir, and you have an asset. And if you get one, treasure him--keep him out of the cocktail circuit, away from the bureaucrats, and let him work in his own way."

Lederer and Burdick
The Ugly American, 1958

Chapter 7

UNITED STATES RESERVE FORCES AS A STRATEGIC ASSET FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

There is a developing recognition of the importance of military civic action in low intensity conflict. The battle for the "hearts and minds" of the campesino in Central America and the Caribbean will likely be the decisive battle to be fought in the region. On its success rests the future of United States security in the area.

Force-Mission Match

Yet, there is another recognition, advancing parallel to the first, that the ability of the United States military to implement a pacification strategy in the area may be overestimated (Brown, 1987, p. 54). Some contend that United States forces are not adequately suited to the task because they "are primarily structured and trained to fight mid-to-high intensity level conflict" and are not readily adaptable to conflict at the low end of the spectrum (USSOUTHCOM, 1986, p. 1). It is, of course, the low end of the conflict scale that is most likely to be encountered in Central America and the Caribbean (as opposed to the "high intensity" conflict anticipated in contingency plans for

Western Europe).

There is wide-spread recognition of the necessity of attacking the root causes of insurgency. Zvgiel (1986) argues that

> The approach to combating insurgency is to mitigate or eliminate the causes of insurgency. If the people can be won over or induced to come closer to the existing host nation government, the insurgent is denied his "sea in which to swim." (p. 59)

In assulting poverty, ignorance and disease, the most effective military units are those from the combat support and combat service support branches. Such units are most effective because they have the capability to build roads, improve sanitary conditions and conduct other nation-building operations.

Bond (1986, p. 82), Zais (1986, pp. 97-98) and the Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project (1986, p. 16-6) argue that in a counter-insurgency the sequence of troop employment is exactly the opposite of that used in large scale strike operations. Zais states that in fighting an insurgency it is the combat support and combat service support forces that are introduced first. Bond argues that in an insurgency the combat support and combat service support forces should be the "first in and the last out."

Reserve Forces Capability

The majority of the Army's combat support and combat service support forces are in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Hultman (1986) urges a greater employment of these Reserve Component forces in low intensity conflict, nation-building roles. He states that

> One of our most effective national assets is the employment of Reserve Component engineering, medical and civil affairs personnel in winning the trust and confidence of freedom-loving peope who, for whatever reason, are isolated from their governments. (p. 7)

Dixon (1987, p. 6) points out that the majority of the Total Army inventory of forces adaptable to nation-building reside in the Reserve Components. As a percent of Total Army combined capability, the Reserve Components account for 64% of non-hospital medical units, 68% of combat engineer units, 74% of deployable Army hospitals, 87% of psychological operations units, 95% of public affairs units, and 97% of civil affairs units (DOD, Defense 87 Almanac, p. 18). Dixon states

> Because counter-insurgency stresses winning the "hearts and minds" of the people, these are specifically the units required to help develop a healthy infrastructure and assist in communicating these accomplishments to the indigenous population. (p. 6)

The matching of Reserve Component capability to the needs of low intensity conflict is gaining increased favor. Former Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger (1986)

acknowledged the value of military civic action and the historic role of the "militia" stating

> civic action [is] the construction and restoration of infrastructures, the assisting of others in the improvement of their own lives, whether by restoring land, building roads, digging wells or helping provide medical and educational services. In the past such work was not thought to be the work of the military. This is the popular wisdom at any rate. But here popular wisdom fails, for it divorces us from our own history--from the memory of the minuteman, standing by his plow with his musket in his hand; and the pioneer defending what he built even as he built it.

Today the "militia," the Reserve Components, are full partners of the Total Army and are fully integrated into Total Army contingency plans and mission statements. Dixon (1987, citing White House National Security Strategy, 1987, p. 31) points out that the Reserve Components are expected to fight with or even ahead of Active Component units. He quotes

> Priority for manning, training, and equipment modernization is not based on their (Reserve Component) peacetime status as forces "in reserve" but on the basis of their direct integration into the nation's operational plans and missions. In many cases, the sequence of deployment in the event of conflict would place Reserve Component units side-by-side and sometimes ahead of active duty forces. (p. 7)

The utility of using Reserve Component soldiers in military civic action operations has not been lost on SOUTHCOM. Hultman (1986) notes

> The...Southern Command is coming to grips with a new doctrine, one that employs military capabilities rather than military force...the sagacious application of what

> has not been reconized as a national asset until now--Reserve Component military and engineering capability together with tangential humanitarian assistance activities--the building blocks of self-sufficiency. (p. 7)

Unique Attributes of Reserve Component Soldiers

Not only do the Reserve Components have a force structure uniquely suited to military civic action, their soldiers possess skills and capabilities that differ significantly from those of their Active Component counterparts in making them particularly well-suited for humanitarian/civic assistance operations in foreign lands.

Individual Expertise

Because the citizen-soldiers of the Reserve Components represent a cross-section of American society, the range of individual skills that exist in the Reserve Components are as broad as those which exist in the United States as a whole. The Reserve Component soldier's civilian skills sometimes match his military assignment but are often totally unrelated to either his unit or the military in general. Within the Reserve Components are literally thousands of fully trained, experienced civilian professionals in fields such as agronomy, horticulture, animal, poultry and fish sciences, public health and sanitation, agricultural economics, and industrial

technology. From a military viewpoint, these are non-traditional skills--but they are skills of which the countries of the Central American and Caribbean are in desperate need. A particularly rich repository of such skills are the land grant colleges and universities of the nation where hundreds, if not thousands, of professors and technicians are also members of the National Guard or Reserve. Other citizen-soldiers, of course, are employed in activities that are directly relevant to more traditional military civic action operations such as in civil engineering, medicine and veterinary science. Levels of expertise available in the Reserve Components extend from the local workshop through the doctoral level.

Thousands of such skilled individuals are assigned to the Individual Ready Reserve. In 1987, the Army reported over 300,000 Individual Ready Reservists (Department of Defense Almanac, 1987, p. 34). These individuals are available for voluntary tours of active duty, tours which could be tailored to best use their individual technical skills in military humanitarian/civic assistance projects in Latin America.

Maturity

In addition to possessing a wide variety of military

and civilian skills often lacking in lesser developed countries. the average Reserve Component soldier is a mature and often concerned U.S. citizen of the Minuteman tradition who is able to interact effectively with the local citizens of Latin America. Reed (1987) reports that on the Abierto Rutas road building project in Equador, for example, Army National Guard troops got along well with the local populace because "...the Guardsmen are older than most GI's, more mature, more married. Young soldiers do not make good ambassadors."

Civilian Links

The part-time nature of Reserve Component soldiers is an often overlooked asset that could have significant implications to a long-term U.S. strategy in the area. Dixon (1987) notes

> it is important to remember their part-time nature as a military force. They can contribute not only through their readiness to execute as required, but also act as an important link to a consistent unity of effort. This link exists because members of the reserve forces are often both enlightened military professionals as well as concerned citizens of the local community. (p. 11)

As citizens, Reserve Component soldiers bring with them to overseas deployment locations their own civilian skills to be used in conjunction with or as a complement to their military skills. But they also have the potential of

establishing contacts and links with the local population that could extend beyond the usual two week training period. The potential exists for Reserve Component soldiers to become catalysts to establish long-term links such as "adopting" villages, orphanages or small, indigenous businesses for continued private sector assistance.

Local Feedback

The personal knowledge of the local overseas area gained by Reserve Component soldiers during deployments make them better informed citizens when they return home to the United States. Having been "on-the-ground" in Central America, for instance, gives the soldier a personal perspective of United States involvement there to include its rationale and difficulties. Upon his return, he is often the "local expert" on Central America in his immediate area and is able to add a note of first-hand realism to often highly filtered press reports of the region's troubles. Such diffusion of direct knowledge of the area into local communities in the United States is seen as one of the major pay-offs of the past deployments of Reserve Component Public Affairs Detachments to Latin America. General John R. Galvin (Binder (1987) states that because most Public Affairs Detachments are composed of journalists

from the local media "the impact these deployments have when they return home is very positive" (p. 40). The more the American public knows about what is going on in Latin America, the better will be the decisions of their elected representatives on policies to be followed there.

Expanded Employment of Reserve Forces in LIC

The nature of Low Intensity Conflict, the composition of Reserve Forces units and the necessity of "reverse employment" of combat support and combat service support units in counter-insurgency operations suggest strongly that attention be paid to the expanded, active, coordinated use of the Reserve Components in humanitarian/civic assistance operations--the use of Reserve Component personnel "ahead of" active duty forces to build nations and win the "hearts and minds" of the rural campesino in Central America and the Caribbean.

The use of Reserve Component forces is particularly appropriate in areas in which there are few active component forces permanently deployed. Dixon (1987) argues that

> The use of reserve forces in these tasks (engineering and medical civic action projects) through unified commands where minimal levels of military forces are deployed...is especially critical. Examples include...USCENTCOM and USLANTCOM where few U.S. bases in the region preclude routine localized humanitarian assistance. Reserve forces can be an excellent alternative. (p. 7)

Reserve Component combat support and combat service support units and individuals constitute an alternative to the ultimate use of U.S. combat forces. Such a view is consistent with that of House Speaker Jim Wright (1987) who states "I'd rather spend some money sending in a peace corps, sending in a literacy corps, sending in a medical corps; then we won't have to send in the Marine Corps" (p. A16).

The expanded use of Reserve Component forces appears both logical and necessary to avoid precisely the situation in which U.S. combat forces would have to be employed to protect national security interests. Hultman (1986) states "The most prudent course to achieve internal security, and the one that at least initially seems to be working, is the strategy that makes use of military capabilities instead of military force" (p. 7). The military, and particularly the Reserve Components, have the capability of building as well as destroying, a capability that holds the potential for a peaceful, long term resolution of the Central American/ Caribbean crisis. Robinson (1987) argues

> If we provided chain saws instead of chain guns, tractors and plows instead of tanks, water wells and drainage ditches instead of military compounds and concertina wire, we'd win the hearts and minds of the people.

Despite the debacle of Vietnam, it is still in the heart and mind of the rural campesino that the battle is

being fought. United States Reserve Component forces. accustomed to using "chain saws and bulldozers." are uniquely qualified to carry the brunt of that battle in Central America and the Caribbean.

Chapter 8

CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSAL

Letter from Ambassador MacWhite (Sarkhan) to the United States Secretary of State--

"The little things we do must be moral acts and they must be done in the real interests of the peoples whose friendship we need--not just in the interests of propaganda ...to the extent that our foreign policy is humane and reasonable, it will be successful. To the extent that it is imperialist and grandiose, it will fail."

Lerder and Burdick, The Ugly American, 1958

Chapter 8

CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSAL

The Coming Revolution and the Moral High Ground

A revolution is coming. It is already at the door. In Latin America, Communist rhetoric is converging with the ideology of liberation theology in a historical repudiation of the existing order. Both groups clearly are seeking radical changes in the status quo, revolutionary changes. The entire post-World War II policy of the United States in Latin America has been to seek to preserve the status quo to ensure stability on its southern flank. It is precisely this status quo that is now under attack--violently by Communist insurgents and morally by the proponents of human rights and liberation theology. The latter seek the liberation of man from his poverty and injustice while the former seek his domination. It is indeed ironic that two groups with such widely divergent religious and moral views should converge in common cause. It is doubly ironic that the United States, a country born of revolution and founded on the idea of the equality of man with "liberty and justice for all," should ever find itself opposing similar revolutions to the south.

Over the long term, absent a sound, moral justification for its policies, the United States government cannot rely on the support of the American electorate. When the cause has a clear moral justification (eg. World War II), the American people will sacrifice "life, fortune and sacred honor" to defend their ideals. When the cause is ambiguous (eg. Vietnam), public dissension will compel a vascillating and ultimately ineffective foreign policy.

The American people will not long support a foreign policy without at least an implicit moral basis. In Latin America, however, it is the Communists who, by attacking an unjust status quo defended by an entrenched and often repressive oligarchy and by championing the rights of the impoverished masses, have staked claim to what many consider to be the morally high ground.

Strategic Reserve Component Military Humanitarian/Civic Assistance Program: A Proposal

Strategic Vision

It is within the power of the United States to reclaim the high moral ground in Latin America by concentrating its resources on eradicating the poverty, ignorance and disease that give rise to insurgencies.

Acknowledging the necessity for a fully-coordinated, integrated and holistic approach to the problems of the region, the U.S. military has but a limited ability to affect such a policy on its own. It does have the ability, however, to lead the way toward this goal by concentrating resources in military civic action operations using Reserve Component units and individuals in cooperative efforts with Central American and Caribbean local authorities aimed at alleviating the misery of the people.

The guiding tenet of such efforts should be a succinctly-stated, strategic military humanitarian/civic assistance policy to guide U.S. forces in their long term efforts. Such a policy should support the national interests over the long term and be undeterred by the ebb and flow of temporary, short term events. It should reflect a national consensus and serve to focus national resources toward a common, widely agreed-to goal, providing a rallying point where, in the heat of the confused tactical decisions inevitable in international relations, both policy maker and field operative can turn for perspective and guidance. As a beacon to guide policy execution through the fog of contemporary reality, such a policy should be stated simply, clearly and unambiguously.

Strategic Policy

It is proposed that a STRATEGIC RESERVE COMPONENT MILITARY HUMANITARIAN/CIVIC ASSISTANCE POLICY for the United States be articulated and an implementing program be instituted. This policy should be:

> *Relying primarily on its Reserve Component assets and proceeding with village-level concensus using appropriate technology, the United States will concentrate the maximum amount of military humanitarian/civic assistance possible at the most basic and local level practical to assist the rural campesino to improve his standard of living.*

Practical Basis

With such a policy, when in doubt as to the purpose or direction of a particular program or proposal, one need only answer the question--"Does this directly help the rural campesino?" Given the limited resources available for U.S. assistance to the region, the answer to this question would serve to focus U.S. efforts on the "center of gravity" of Communist insurgencies, the rural poor. The implementing agents for such a policy would be those strategic military assets of the United States best suited to humanitarian/ civic assistance operations, the Reserve Comoonents.

Moral Basis

The moral basis for the United States Strategic

Reserve Component Military Humanitarian/Civic Assistance Program coincides with the liberation theologists' argument that poverty is a sin against God. For the United States, a great nation born of revolution and founded on the belief in God and the equality of men, such a rationale and justification for a long term military civic action program for the area is imminently practical. Such a policy would "take the high ground" morally and would deny the Communist opportunists the strategically critical advantage of pretending to fight for the human rights of the common people. By championing the poor and encouraging regional governments to do the same, the United States would align itself with the inevitable revolutionary changes that are beginning to sweep Latin America.

While it is sometimes charged that the Christian base communities established by the practioners of liberation theology have given rise to Communist insurgencies, it should be carefully noted that campesinos become radicalized only when they perceive blatant injustice or inattention to their needs by the government. The religious workers and priests of liberation theology, by applying biblical teachings to the actual world, are raising the consciousness of the campesino to perceive the injustice and moral and economic poverty of his situation. In many cases, the

campesinos of the base communities as well as the secular poor have organized not only to work their fields but also to make their needs known politically to government authorities. When their petitions are ignored or when governmental repression of their organizations becomes evident, the radicalization process flourishes. It is the "enlightened campesino" who, having become radicalized through governmental inattention or repression, becomes the target of Communist organizers.

The proposed United States Strategic Reserve Component Military Humanitarian/Civic Assistance Program would intervene precisely at the point where the campesino is making demands for the improvement of his condition. U.S. efforts would focus on assisting the "enlightened campesino" to improve his lot in life. Done in cooperation with the local government, with village-level concensus, and using assisted self-help projects with appropriate technology, the campesino would have diminished impetus to take up arms with the Communists.

Need for New Reserve Component Mission Statement

The implementation of such a strategic policy requires the expansion and possible redirection of on-going U.S. military civic action operations. It requires the

National Guard and Reserve to be given the formal mission of military humanitarian/civic assistance in Central America and the Caribbean Basin. A formal mission tasking would allow the Reserve Components to undertake civic action projects, not as an adjunct to unit training, but as a mission unto itself, thus enabling them to apply their resources directly to the problems at hand without first establishing a cogent tie to mission-related training. With such latitude, the Reserve Components could utilize the myriad of civilian technical skills of their individual members as well as the collective skills of their units to attack the socio-economic roots of insurgency in the area.

This expanded mission for the Reserve Components likely would require Congressional approval both to formalize the new, non-traditional mission statement and to secure funding for expanded military humanitarian/civic assistance operations in the region. Political opposition from some quarters could be anticipated. The proposal, however, is consistent with the general tone and nation-building recommendations of the 1984 National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (see Appendix C: Recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America) and coincides with the virtually unanimous desire for peace, not war, in the area. When compared to

the costs of expanded combat operations in the region or to the consequences of Soviet usurpation of indigenous revolutions, its expense would be minimal. It is, in short, a cost-effective, morally defensible, strategic policy with long term pay-offs for both the United States and the peoples of Central America and the Caribbean Basin.

The American Right of Revolution

The revolution against the inequitable status quo in Latin America has begun--peacefully and democratically in some nations, violently and oppressively in others. The common denominator is a desire by diverse and often divergent groups for a change in existing unjust social, economic and political structures.

Seeing the abject poverty in which many Latin Americans live, Robert Kennedy (1966, cited in LaFeber, 1984) argued

> These people will not accept this kind of existence for the next generation. We would not; and they will not. There will be changes...a revolution is coming--a revolution which will be peaceful if we are wise enough; compassionate if we care enough; successful if we are fortunate enough--but a revolution which is coming whether we want it or not. We can affect its character; we cannot affect its inevitability. (p. 160)

The revolution is now at the door. The winds of change are blowing at the bulwarks of the existing status quo, cracking its foundations and sending shudders amongst

its defenders. Leaning into the storm, the United States has too often found itself tolerating a status quo of social, economic and political injustices that would be abhorrent within its own borders. The real revolution in Latin America is first and foremost a revolution against this oppressive status quo. It is within this context that Communist insurgents seek to advance their own agenda in the region. For the United States, the situation is a historic contradiction of its own heritage, a heritage of struggle against oppression by the few of the many. The nation, however, is not without historical guidance in the crisis. Truths, once self-evident but now obscure, are still applicable. Once, long ago, an angry young revolutionary wrote

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness--That to secure these Rights, Governments are initiated among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it.

The Right of Revolution against an oppressive status quo and the right to have a government "of the people, by the people and for the people" has been defended by Americans for over two hundred years. It is time we open the door and ally ourselves, through an expanded and enlightened Reserve

Component-based military humanitarian/civic assistance program, with our heritage. It is time we embrace the Revolution of Rising Expectations in Latin America and work together to secure political liberty and socio-economic justice for all the People of the Americas. President Kennedy's words have never been more applicable:

> Now the trumpet summons us again, not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need; not as a call to battle, though embattled we are; but a call to bear the burdens of a long twilight struggle--a struggle against the common enemies of man--tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself.

To the south, the trumpet has sounded. Who will answer its call?

APPENDICES

"Ambassador MacWhite. I really don't think we should take the time of these other gentlemen to go over this again," Mr Gordon said. caught between the antagonism of the French and Vietnamese and his respect for MacWhite.

"It won't take long." Atkins cut in. "I told them the first step was to start things that the Vietnamese can do themselves. Then they can go on to the big things as they pick up the skills."

"What kind of things should they start with?" MacWhite asked.

"First. like a brick factory. Cheap to start. easy to run. and it would give them building materials. Second. stone quarries back in the hills. Plenty of good stone there. and it could be used for building."

The Frenchman was red in the face. He spoke quickly to the tall Vietnamese. and then stood up.

"Mr Atkins," he said in perfect English, "you may not know it. but a French firm has a concession to handle the production of building materials in this country. If everyone started forming brick and quarry companies. it would ruin our relationship."

"That's your problem. not mine," said Atkins. "Third. someone ought to set up a

model canning plant. The country people catch fish and raise vegetables, but they spoil before they can be brought to town. Small, cheap canning plants in about twenty towns would do plenty to help out. Fourth, the coastal land from Qui Nhom to Phan Rang is acid and it won't grow anything. But right back of it, just over the hills, is a long strip of beautiful rich land. Why not just run little finger-roads back through the jungle so the coastal people can get to the good land? It's cheap and it's easy. Couple of bulldozers could rip out the roads and that would be that."

Lederer and Burdick,
The Ugly American. 1958

APPENDIX A

COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGIES

INSURGENCY IN CENTRAL AMERICA



[1] Salvadoran insurgents conducted offensive in January 1983 but did not make significant gains.
[2] Nicaraguan insurgency depicted is the *Sandinista* overthrow of Anastasio Somoza Debayle's regime.

Figure 1

SOURCE: Johnson, William P., Jr. (Colonel, U.S. Army) and Russell, Eugene N. (Colonel, U.S. Army). An Army Strategy and Structure. Military Review. August 1986. pp. 69-77.

HOST COUNTRY STRATEGY



Figure 2

US ARMY STRATEGY



FMS—Foreign military sales IMET—International Military Education and Training

Figure 3

APPENDIX B

MISSION-FORCE MATCH

Low-Intensity Conflict: The Mission-Force Match

MISSION	ARMY FORCES*
Peacekeeping	Military police
Peacetime contingency operations	
Intelligence-gathering	Military intelligence, Special Forces, Special Operations Forces (SOF)
Strike operations:	
Small-scale	SOF: Rangers, Special Forces, etc.
Large-scale	All from small scale plus light infantry, airborne, combat support plus combat service support
Rescue/recovery	SOF: Rangers, Special Forces, etc.
Demonstration or show of force . . .	Airborne, light infantry
Terrorism counteraction	
Antiterrorism (defensive)	All forces
Counterterrorism (offensive)	SOF
Counterinsurgency	
(Foreign Internal Defense and Development) Phase one: Latent and incipient insurgency	Engineers, medics, signal, civil affairs, psychological operations, military intelligence, logistics, etc.
Phase two: Guerrilla warfare	All from phase one plus trainers from Special Forces (sometimes light infantry)
Phase three: War of movement . . .	All from phases one and two plus conventional forces (primarily light infantry and airborne, later motorized and mechanized)

*Forces are listed in general order of priority of appropriateness and/or sequence of deployment and employment.

SOURCE: Zais, Mitchell M. (Maior, U.S. Army). LIC: Matching Missions and Forces. Military Review. August 1986. pp. 79, 89-99.

Appendix C

NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA: RECOMMENDATIONS

National Bipartisan Commission on Central America:

Recommendations

1 Organize summit of U.S. and Central American leaders.

2 Increase private sector involvement.

3 Establish U.S. government role in renegotiation of official debt.

4 Encourage renegotiation of private debt.

5 Increase economic aid in FY 1984.

6 More emphasis on housing and infrastructure.

7 Provide trade credit guarantees.

8 Revitalize Central American Common Market.

9 The United States should join the Central American Bank for Economic Integration.

10 Should be a major increase in other donor assistance to Central America.

11 Authorize $8 billion in U.S. assistance funds and guarantees for 5 years. FY 1985-FY 1989.

12 Appropriate funds on a multi-year basis.

13 Require host government economic policy reforms.

14 Help create a Central American Development Organization.

15 Use economic aid to promote democracy:

15.1 Promote community organizations and democratic institutions:

15.2 Expand USIA's binational centers:

change are blowing at the bulwarks of the existing status quo, cracking its foundations and sending shudders amongst

15.3 Increase USIA's exchange programs.

16 Help Central Americans to receive duty-free trade with other countries.

17 Review U.S. nontariff barriers.

18 Promote exports from Central America and development of energy sources.

19 Establish a venture capital corporation.

20 Expand Overseas Private Investment Corporation insurance coverage.

21 Promote small businesses.

22 Accelerate agricultural development:

22.1 Provide long-term credit for land purchases by small farmers:

22.2 Study the holding of idle, potentially productive land:

22.3 Improve title registration and the defense of property rights by farmers:

22.4 Provide short- and medium-term credit for working capital improvements and equipment:

22.5 Encourage pricing policies which protect the interests of both producers and consumers:

22.6 Encourage an equitable distribution of agricultural wealth, including agrarian reform and land-to-the-landless type program:

22.7 Improve and expand rural infrastructure, eg., roads, storage facilities, and rural electrification:

22.8 Increase rural research and extension programs:

22.9 Halt deforestation and environmental degradation: and

22.10 Increase support for cooperatives.

23 Increase emergency food aid.

24 Increase funding for training and education programs:

24.1 The Peace Corps should expand recruitment of teachers to serve in a new literacy corps;

24.2 The Peace Corps should expand recruitment of primary, secondary, and vocational teachers to serve in a new Central American teachers corps:

24.3 Expand secondary-level technical and vocational education and apprenticeship programs:

24.4 Increase support for education programs in business and public administration;

24.5 Expand the International Executive Service Corps:

24.6 Develop a program for 10,000 government-sponsored scholarships;

24.7 Prepare and implement a plan to strengthen universities: and

24.8 Subsidize translation, publication, and distribution of books and educational material.

25 Expand health and nutrition programs:

25.1 Increase technical assistance for health programs:

25.2 Eradicate vector-borne diseases, e.g., malaria and dengue fever:

25.3 Expand oral rehydration and immunization programs;

25.4 Train primary health care workers: and

25.5 Encourage adequate public investment in primary health care and in preventive and environmental interventions.

26 Continue A.I.D. population and family planning programs.

27 Strengthen judicial systems; impose sanctions against death squad members.

28 Support refugee programs.

29 Give more military aid to El Salvador.

30 Authorize multi-year funding of military aid to ensure predictability.

31 Military aid to El Salvador should be tied to periodic reports on human rights, progress toward free elections and elimination of death squad activities, and other political reforms.

SOURCE: United States Department of State. Agency for International Development, Office of Management and Budget. Special Report No. 162--Report to the President and the Congress: A Plan for Fully Funding the Recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission of Central America. Washington D.C.: GPO, March 1987.

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